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Abstract
As private non-profit, locally based organizations, community development financial institutions
(CDFIs) are increasingly important supporters of community development policies and programs
designed to alleviate poverty. In the face of declining federal funds and political support for
social programs, deregulation in banking, and capital market failure, CDF~s provide a range of
financial services that encourage economic self-sufficiency and wealth in low-income
communities. In order to expand their impact, some CDFIs have increased their assets to serve
more customers and offer more products and services. This thesis seeks to answer the question:
which factors and practices do large CDFIs employ to increase their total assets that other small
CDFIs do not?
This thesis uses two research methodologies: web surveys and case study interviews. Surveys of
low-income credit unions (LICUs) and community development loan funds (CDLFs) indicate
that large CDFIs grow through geographic expansion, customer and product diversification,
more debt and equity funding sources, and a focus on fundraising. Two case studies of prominent
CDFIs-Opportunities Credit Union in Burlington, VT and The Reinvestment Fund in
Philadelphia, PA-reveal how leadership and creative partnerships drive change that results in
organizational scale and asset growth. The thesis concludes with recommendations for CDFIs,
investors, and policymakers that are interested in supporting the growth of individual CDFIs and
CDFIs as an industry.
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Chapter 1.
Institutions Financing Development
in Low-Income Communities
Introduction
Non-profit community development credit unions (CDCUs) and loan funds (CDLFs) are
amassing financial resources and mobilizing money in unique ways that extend capital to low-
income communities traditionally ignored by banks and other conventional financial institutions.
Their programs and policies are designed to alleviate poverty by increasing the flow of capital
that creates and sustains decent housing, small businesses, and job opportunities for people in
urban and rural places. Part of a larger community development system of locally-controlled,
community-based organizations (CBOs) and community development financial institutions
(CDFIs) in the United States (US), CDCUs and CDLFs promise to strengthen local communities,
build individual and family assets, foster regional economies, and develop more efficient and
more equitable capital markets. Specifically, they provide a range of financial services: business
financing for job creation, construction financing for development of affordable housing and
community facilities (e.g., schools and day care centers), and consumer banking services and
financial education that encourage economic self-sufficiency and wealth. Even though they are a
small fraction of global financial systems, CDCUs and CDLFs are important because they are
local private market, or non-governmental, financial institutions that advance wealth and asset
creation for low-income people and communities where few choices and few assets otherwise
exist.
Federal Policy Context
Today, CBOs and CDFIs operate in an era of banking deregulation and federal cutbacks
in social welfare programs designed to alleviate poverty. National political support for federal
social programs, such as housing provision and job creation and training, has declined
significantly since Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty legislation of the1960s. Federal spending
on community development and other social programs is contracting. However, in 1994,
legislation created the CDFI Fund, a department of the US Treasury that granted funds to locally
controlled private non-profit organizations to provide consumer banking, credit and lending
services to low-income communities. A market-based model to alleviate poverty, CDFIs
leverage almost 20 times the federal contribution with private market debt financing and other
equity contributions (CDFI Fund 2005). Conventional government social programs have mainly
focused on grants funding for income payments or subsidies for basic needs, including housing,
food and medical benefits; however, the recent deregulatory trend in federal social policy (i.e.,
welfare and housing) policy promotes self-sufficiency and employment. The CDFI Fund, and
other market-based and tax credit policies, encourage private investment in low-income
communities in lieu of direct federal funding for asset family and community development.
By many accounts, New Deal and Great Society policies that focus on poverty have
either failed or are too small to significantly affect the overall population of poor people. For
instance, public housing was deemed a failed experiment to fill a need for affordable housing
among low-income citizens, especially in urban areas, because it concentrated poverty.' The
social problems associated with concentrated poverty have been well documented in the popular
media, public policy circles, and academic literature. Since the 1960s, a free market ideology of
capitalistic individualism has spawned government deregulation in banking and federal cutbacks
in social welfare programs (Immergluck, 2004).2 Discussion of poverty and how to combat it
effectively has all but dropped from the current national political agenda. It is beyond the scope
of this study to look at the political and social causes in this shift; however, the history and
public policies around poverty, and in particular, those focused on community development
organizations provide an important backdrop for this research into CDFI growth.
Community Based Organizations and Community Development Finance
Community development corporations (CDCs) and other non-profit, private agencies
come in all shapes and sizes because they are locally controlled organizations-or community-
While it is less discussed, rural poverty has different spatial dimensions, which might make it harder to combat
because there are few economies of scale for the provision of in person social and financial services.
2 Aside from Immergluck's academic account, popular media often sensationalizes poverty problems rather than
highlighting policy solutions, which if discussed at all, are framed as contributing to poverty rather than alleviating
it. Simultaneously, public policy makers are wrapped in an ideological debate as to the root causes of poverty:
whether poverty is an individual problem-poor people are poor because they put themselves into poverty-or a
structural problem-poor people are poor because political policies and the capitalist economic system create
poverty. No matter where one stands on the ideological spectrum from pure individualism on one hand to pure
structural determinism on the other, the fact remains that the federal government is in the midst of moving away
from public policies and programs that seek to counter poverty to private ones.
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based organizations (CBOs). Each has a local history of community struggle in pursuit of social
and economic rights of poor people and other marginalized racial and ethnic communities.
Community development programs often center on the construction and management of
affordable housing as well as supportive services that train low-income people for jobs, help
them start small businesses, and perform community outreach to organize, mobilize, and build
political support for their programs (as well as other issues of neighborhood concern). In
addition, some CBOs have assumed management of social programs from local or state
governments. For example, in Massachusetts, many more CBOs (and other private training
organizations) train more workers than federal agencies) In short, federal funding has moved
away from direct program management to funding private sector organizations. Core financing
for CBOs comes from federal, state, and local governments as well as private philanthropies,
charities, and wealthy individuals. Banks and other financial institutions provide working capital,
loans for construction, and real estate mortgages. Private non-profit community development
intermediaries, like CDFIs, provide financing, often in partnership with banks, and technical
assistance to CBOs. Two of the most well known national examples of community development
financial and technical assistance intermediaries are the Local Initiatives Support Corporation
(LISC) and Neighborworks America. "LISC [was] organized by the Ford Foundation [in 1979]
to identify and support 50 to 100 community groups worthy of financial support. By 2004, LISC
had served more than 2,800 community development corporations (CDCs) nationwide."4
Founded as a non-profit organization by Congress in 1978, Neighborworks America currently
works with 245 partner CDCs and CBOs for housing and community development.'
As direct public funding decreases for CBOs, private sector financing through local
intermediaries becomes more important for the development and maintenance of organizations
requiring some sort of subsidy or technical support. In other words, community development
service provision can be costly to administer, especially if low-income clients pay no fees for
service and public funds provide less operational support. For many CBOs, especially
community development corporations (CDCs), residential real estate provides revenue streams to
3 White, Gene, and Ulvin, Johan. (May 2004.) "Training Providers in the Commonwealth." Research and
Evaluation Brief Vol. 1, Issue 3. Commonwealth Corporation, available at
http://www.commcorp.org/researchandevaluation/documents/ResearchBrief 1-I 3.pdf
4 Retrieved by author, May 14, 2006 from http://www.lisc.org/section/aboutus/history/
5 Retrieved by author, May 14, 2006 from http://www.nw.org/network/nwdata/NeighborWorksOrganizations.asp
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cover operating costs. But as a non-profit organization, there are limits to the amount of income
an organization can derive from its investments in low-income housing. Regardless, CBO and
CDC real estate portfolios are often small with significant regulatory and accounting
requirements due in part to the large number of public and private funding sources involved in
financing each project. If they grow at all, CBOs can take a long time to reach a sustainable level
of new housing production, to say nothing about maintaining its existing assets. Other services,
such as job training and small business consulting, require grants and other contributions to
sustain, unless an organization can earn enough on revenue generated from other programs like
housing provision.
What has been little documented is the growth and development of a unique brand of
private sector CBO-community development financial institutions (CDFIs)-which fills the
local financial gaps left by private capital market failures and by declining federal government
support in building affordable housing, providing technical assistance and support to small
businesses, and offering affordable consumer banking services and credit. Some CDFIs, like
banks and credit unions, for instance, are regulated, federally-insured depository institutions that
target low-income people and communities. Other CDFIs are non-profit loan funds, offering debt
financing to CBOs and businesses. Some CDFIs are stand-alone, for-profit ventures in low-
income geographic areas. Regardless of the type, CDFIs are part of a national, private market
system of community development finance intermediaries for low-income people and places.
They are mission-driven and place-based, but function like conventional financial businesses,
offer consumer banking services and business and real estate financing. Instead of spurning low-
income communities, CDFIs embrace them.
Capital Market Failure
A simple model of perfect competition in microeconomic theory dictates a business has
the potential to grow if it operates in a frictionless market with low barriers to entry. However,
capital markets are not perfectly competitive or frictionless; they have market inefficiencies,
including asymmetric information and adverse selection, which leads to market failure (Dymski
2005; Benjamin, Rubin, and Zeilenbach 2004; Scorsone and Weiler 2004; Immergluck 2002;
Moy and Okagaki 2001; and Parzen and Kieschnick 1994). Debt and equity capital markets
suffer from information failure that results in thin investment or a shortage of affordable
financial services in low-income neighborhoods and communities, giving rise to the need for
development banks, including a variety of CDFIs. Parzen and Kieschnick (1992) maintain capital
market failure creates the need for development banking by state and local governments as well
as alternative private market institutions such as credit unions and loan funds.' While the lack of
information is one critical issue facing development finance institutions, Dymski (2005) observes
two other reasons why operating in "new markets" are problematic.
First, all development projects are subject to problems of Keynesian uncertainty and asymmetric
infonrmation; second, wealth levels in lower-income and majority non-white communities are
typically far lower than elsewhere; third, financial dynamics in lower-income and majority non-
white communities often encourage wealth decumulation. Over time, the spatially-fixed assets
that do exist in areas with all three development problems often decline due to inadequate
maintenance and to low levels of local asset turnover and investment. Of course, this
underinvestment in physical and business assets is often paralleled by underinvestment in social
assets.
Dymski raises valid critical social issues, yet offers many more questions than answers. One
critical question he asks of CDFIs is, "Are you creating dedicated assets for a community with
fixed needs, locked into non-mainstream markets; or are you facilitating the inclusion of
marginal populations and areas in mainstream asset-building processes?" The answer is often not
one or the other, rather variations on both, according to the nature of a project, program,
organization, and market opportunities embedded in local and regional economies. But how this
looks in practice is elusive for economists or other academics, which have paid little attention to
CDFIs (Dymnski 2005; Benjamin, Rubin, and Zeilenbach 2004).
Building off of capital market theories of asymmetrical information and adverse
selection, Scorsone and Weiler (2004) conclude "these [economic] ideas point to a potential role
for the public sector, such as through government specialists and universities, in overcoming
information failures as a cause of economic stagnation and decline." However, because they lend
in low-income markets, CDFIs must overcome the lack of information and small profit margins
in the markets in which they operate. Yet, CDFIs are neither government specialists nor
6 This is not to say that for-profit banks and venture capital, which are often affiliated with non-profit CDLFs, are
not important models of community development finance. CDFI Fund legislation corralled multiple organizational
models under one definitional umbrella (i.e., CDFI). However, Parzen and Kieschnick (1992) favored commercial
banks as the best organizational type through which to finance community development. By far, the CDFI Fund has
certified more loan funds as CDFIs than any other model. Many nonprofit CDFIs have for-profit subsidiaries or
affiliates that support the nonprofit business. Off-balance sheet financing is an emerging field with secondary
markets, loan pooling, venture capital, and New Markets Tax Credits (NMTC) as some promising subsidiaries to
fuel nonprofit growth. Though critical of the Small Businesses Administration's New Markets Venture Capital
Program, Bates (2002) indicates that community development venture capital is best when funds are capitalized with
most or all equity contributions.
universities, which begs the question: can they fill this function alone without significant input
from the public and academic sectors? They are actively creating transactional information in
low-income markets; however, evaluation of economic and social outcomes is limited to
organizational and industry levels rather than to geography and the dynamics of spatial
economies. Regardless of the response to Dymnski's questions, CDFIs strive to fill both
information and capital gaps across a broad range of markets-they are bridging organizations
with highly customized economic and social interactions. While there are presumed to be many
potential synergies between government, higher education, and CDFIs, a large capital and spatial
mismatch between client and investor markets can prove difficult for a small, one-person CDFI
to overcome, especially if the regional business and banking economy is stagnating and there is
little individual or institutional wealth willing to make social investments with a below market
rate of return.
If capital market failure exists, CDFIs will be the only market competition because no
profit maximizing enterprises will operate in the market because it is not worth it for them to be
there. In other words, they feel investment in research and development would not yield
significant economic returns. Yet, CDFIs focus on social and economic benefits to bridge this
capital gap between borrowers, investors, and government. Nowak (2001) argues that CDFIs
function as regional civic intermediaries, bridging many audiences for a common public purpose.
Early CDFIs were thought to be a parallel system for low-income communities borne out of civil
rights and federal community development policies in the 1960s7 and bolstered by Clinton
Administration urban policies: CDFI Fund and New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) (Dymnski
2005). While the CDFI Fund has extended matching equity and debt funds to CDFIs, NMTC
leverage private investment capital for for-profit commercial development enterprises (mostly,
real estate projects) in low-income census tracts. Therefore, CDFIs are embedded in regional
economies and competing with a wider array of community development entities at the national
level. However, community economic development still retains and often demands a
neighborhood orientation, spanning low-income communities and national policies.
CDFIs have not restructured financial and accounting infrastructure nor standardized to
the degree of conventional banking, which has undergone significant industry consolidation
7 Credit unions had federal enabling legislation passed during the Depression; however the total number of credit
unions peaked in the 1960s at over 20,000 organizations. Today there are approximately 9,000 credit unions.
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along with information technology innovation and risk standardization (i.e., credit scoring).
Banks have fundamentally altered the level of transactional infornation, which bolsters
secondary markets that feed into global financial investment and capital markets (Benjamin,
Rubin, and Zeilenback 2004: Stanton 2003; Yago, Zeidman, and Schmidt 2003; and Moy and
Okagaki 2001). By their very nature, CDFIs are not standard. While secondary markets have not
proved to be the panacea some industry advocates had hoped for, over 20 CDFIs have developed
secondary markets, loan pooling, and securitization for the CDFI industry (OFN 2006), most
notably Self-Help Ventures Fund through a secondary mortgage product, and Community
Reinvestment Fund through buying and reselling loans from CDFI portfolios. However, these
secondary market products are targeting CDFIs and other below market lenders (e.g., state
industrial development authorities, banks, credit unions, and other mortgage lenders that cannot
resell mortgages) rather than attracting market-rate investments.
CDFIs address capital market failures with two growth strategies: raising and managing
capital from social investors and earning interest and fees from borrowers that will allow them to
increase organizational assets, sustain self-sufficient operations, and increase community
impact.' If a CDFI increases the number and dollar amounts of equity and debt capital it raises, it
can deploy more financing and enhance its ability to earn-and compound-economic and social
returns in the future. CDFIs must maintain a long-term financial and community perspective that
is unlike other investment vehicles that are driven by short-term gains. Additionally, if a CDFI
can increase its ongoing earnings, it can do the same as well as make it attractive to more social
investors as CDFI investment products approach a market rate of return.9 These two potential
outcomes-more raised capital and more earned income-require CDFIs to adopt a dual focus
on customer and investor markets. Moy and Ratliffe (2004) recognize the need for CDFIs to
focus on customer niches to scale products. What is little understood is how CDFIs lever human
capital and partnerships into product, organizational, and industry innovations to achieve positive
returns to social and economic scale. Models offer opportunities for organizational reflection;
however, they do not detail how to obtain accurate market information, achieve organizational
efficiency and sustainability through responsible risk management and financial stewardship.
8 This thesis contains an underlying bias that CDFIs have had and will continue to have positive social and economic
impacts on local and regional economies.
9 Daniels and Nixon (2004) argue that CDFIs are first wave urban investment vehicles and that market rate urban
development with social returns and market rate economic returns.
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More Policv Context: Community Reinvestment Act and the CDFI Fund"'
Since the original Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977, banks are required to
make mortgages and small business loans in places (i.e., geographic areas) where they take
deposits. The rationale for this legislation included the history of discriminatory practices (e.g.,
mortgage discrimination through "redlining" a neighborhood, usually non-white, white ethnic,
and poor communities). CRA and companion legislation, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
require banks to disclose mortgage and small business lending information, which increases the
transparency about the lending market, for public and governmental review. Simply put, a bank
can earn CRA credits for investing in businesses, real estate projects, and consumer mortgage
lending in low-income communities. Despite the CRA's impacts, there are still financing
services and banking markets that many banks do not service. Moreover, they do not use credit
and banking services to advance community development goals, such as individual and
community asset building.
Federal policies in the 1990s fused government investment in social welfare with private
market economic logic. In 1994, the Reigle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act created the CDFI Fund to provide financial support and technical assistance to
CDFIs as well as run the Bank Enterprise Awards, which award grants to banks for investment in
community development projects. Since 1996, the CDFI Fund has invested over $700 million
cumulatively in hundreds of CDFIs. A 2005 CDFI report on FY 2003 data for 223 CDFIs
indicates that
information collected through [the Community Investment Impact System (CIIS)] suggests that
CDFIs are dynamic institutions, building their assets and becoming financially stronger over time.
The data suggests that the more mature CDFIs are, the more access they have to capital, the larger
their staffs, the more they diversify and grow their portfolios, and the more self-sufficient they
are."
Moreover,
the CDFI Fund estimates that CDFI Program awardees leverage each Financial Assistance
Component award dollar with $19.63 in private and non-CDFI Fund public dollars, thereby
providing the federal government a much greater return in community development outcomes
than the government's investment dollars could provide on their own."
10 Due to the limited scope of the research, this thesis omits other federal programs that benefit CDFIs, including
those offered by the Small Business Administration and other federal, state, and local agencies.
" Retrieved by author May 14, 2006 from http://www.cdfifund.gov/news/2006/maturingCDFIbenefits.pdf
2 Retrieved by author May 14, 2006 from http://www.cdfifund.gov/impact wemake/Leverage.pdf
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Clearly, the federal government is attempting to leverage small amounts of government dollars
for community development projects and programs through CDFIs, using economic financing
mechanisms. However, it is not clear whether mature CDFIs offer greater government dollar
leverage opportunities than younger CDFIs. More importantly, the CDFI Fund does not compare
leverage opportunities between large and small CDFIs.
CDFIs promote a bridge between capital markets and low-income communities. While
the CDFI Fund does not report the impact of CRA credits on bank investments in CDFIs, many
CDFIs collaborate with banks by participating in loans for community development projects or
by using below-market rate financing from banks to finance CDFI lending at a higher rate. In
other words, banks receive CRA credits on their investment in exchange for a lower economic
return on investment, subsidizing a CDFI, which lends the money out at a higher rate. Federal
CRA and CDFI Fund legislation encourages CDFIs to function as intermediaries between low-
income borrowers, CBOs, and businesses on one hand, and banks and other public and private
investors on the other.
CRA and CDFI legislation is fueled in large part by political activism concerning how
banks receive financial resources from consumers and make investment decisions. As profit-
motivated corporations, banks seek to maximize the amount of money they make on each loan;
therefore, they make loans to people based on the prospective borrower's assets and/or credit. Of
course, low-income people have few assets and often little or bad credit. This leads banks to
deny them loans--a process of discrimination and wealth decumulation. If a bank does lend to
low-income individuals and families, they often adjust their interest rates or fees to account for
the higher risk associated with loan default. Unfortunately, the result is that low-income people,
even with fair and equal access to capital, pay a steep price for that capital, which puts them at
risk of bankruptcy and may actually decrease-or deacumulate-their net wealth rather than
contributing to asset accumulation through what some activists call predatory or abusive lending.
In other words, those who can least afford debt pay the most for it. Moreover, the lack of bank
investment in low-income areas is often blamed for contributing to neighborhood deterioration,
by compounding already poor economic opportunities for low-wealth communities.
Thesis Rationale
CDFIs attempt to alleviate the negative affects of poverty by filling a niche intermediary
function between low-income consumers, grassroots CBOs that work in low-income
communities, the public sector-including national, state and local governments-and private
sector banks, foundations, and corporations. As CDFIs mediate and engage each of these
stakeholders, they face the pitfalls of 1) attracting capital to advance social goals that are difficult
to quantify economically; and 2) using market-based financial mechanisms that test the revenue
generating potential of non-profit organizational models. This thesis explores both themes as
they relate to asset growth and organizational scale. In order to increase their impact, some
CDCUs and CDLFs continue to attract new assets to increase their lending capacity in pursuit of
their mission. Only a small number of CDCUs and CDLFs have grown to exceed $20 million in
assets. Asset growth is linked to an organization's geographic area or membership market for
community development financing and services, its capacity to earn revenue in that market and
raise funds that support operational sustainability and growth. However, organizational limits to
asset accumulation may exist. Many CDCUs are cooperatives started for residents of one
neighborhood or people that attend a certain church or work at a certain place of employment.
CDLFs are sometimes embedded in neighborhood community development corporations or
focus on lending to non-profits in a city with few non-profits. These organizations might follow a
limited strategy of growth. Moreover, it can take a long time for an organization to grow through
profits, or retained earnings. Yet, if the goal is to achieve wider social benefits for low-income
communities by expanding financing products and services, asset growth is a good way to serve
more customers and lead change in business, politics, and society.
By accident or design, fortune or folly, a small number of CDFIs control a large share of
total industry assets. In 2003, the five largest CDFIs (of 477) controlled 31 % of almost $9 billion
in assets-the 25 largest CDFIs controlled 62%. Clearly, CDFI industry assets are concentrated
in only a handful of organizations. While industry groups indicate that there are approximately
1,000 CDFIs nationally, relatively few have amassed a significant asset base. With total assets
around $1 billion, the largest CDFIs are no larger than a mid-sized community bank or a small
corporation. In stark contrast, 70% of CDFIs had less than $10 million in assets; median credit
union assets were $2 million and median loan fund assets were $6 million (CDP 2004).
Research Question and Methodology
This thesis seeks to answer the question: which factors and practices do large CDFIs
employ to increase their total assets that other small CDFIs do not? Clearly, there are only a few
large CDFIs and many fewer small ones. A large CDFI reflects the extent it has been able to
expose its financing products and community development services to more customers and
attract new funding sources to support the growth of existing products and the development of
new products. A small CDFI is either growing really slowly or losing money over time if it
cannot attract new sources of equity through fundraising. Similar to any bank or for-profit
businesses, CDFIs grow through internally generated revenues or through external investment
made possible by equity grants and debt financing. However, unlike for-profit businesses, they
are non-profit financial organizations that support CBOs and businesses, many of which require
subsidy to sustain their operations. While the private markets for investment and finance might
deem these organizations too risky, CDFIs balance earning revenue from these customers and
raising enough subsidy to sustain their own operations. With few assets, survival becomes
difficult and growth is even more so. More net equity assets after accounting for operating costs
and debt service enable a CDFI to borrow more money in the future to expand its financing
products and services. With declining public and private equity investments, for which many
CBOs and CDFIs are clamoring, CDFIs must manage their capital resources to sustain their
operations and grow. It is this internally generated growth that many CDFIs have yet to master.
To answer to the main research question, this study uses two research methods for
different, but related, purposes. First, a web survey was conducted to understand the
characteristics of LICUs and CDLFs and make distinctions between large and small
organizations. Survey results appear in Chapter 2. The surveys are snapshots in time that attempt
to approximate change over time. For example, questions about total assets, geography and
population, number of employees, and sources and types of capital appeared on each survey.
Each question was asked about two time periods-the first year of the organization's operation
and it's most recent fiscal year. (See Appendix I for response summary, Appendix 2 for LICU
survey questions and responses, and Appendix 3 for CDLF survey questions and responses.)
While this is an imperfect methodology, it strives to measure relative change in credit unions and
loan funds in the first year of operation and today to describe how CDFIs grow over time. The
advantage is that the results are easily compiled to show changes in organizations from the year
they started to more recent time. The disadvantage is that the respondent may not have accwate
knowledge of year 1, especially if the organization is older (many credit unions, for instanc) and
records were not kept. 3
Second, narrative case studies of two large CDFIs were conducted. Opportunities Cedit
Union (Opportunities), a rural CDCU in Burlington, Vermont, and The Reinvestment Fund
(TRF), an urban CDLF in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania provide detailed windows into
organizational change and asset growth at two prominent CDFIs, which offers room for
comparison with the organizational profiles of large and small organizations developed through
the LICU and CDLF surveys in Chapter 2. Opportunities and TRF are unique among most of
their CDFI peers because of their asset growth since their founding in 1989 and 1985,
respectively. Moreover, they have received attention from national foundations and
intermediaries as examples of organizations with best practices for community development
finance. Rather than focus on product innovation, the case narratives are organizational studies
of the different paths that Opportunities and TRF have taken to grow to scale. Importantly, they
have increased their community development outcomes, including number of banking customers
or number of mortgages, and number of housing units financed and jobs created, respectively.
These outcomes are associated with asset growth; however, like any business, each organization
believes that asset growth and scale stems from meeting the organizational mission and vision to
help alleviate poverty though financial products and services to low-income people and
communities. This study does not focus on community development outcomes, but seeks to build
a snapshot of each organization based on financial reports, marketing materials, and interviews
with staff and board members. In other words, growth in total assets is the outcome of
organizational change that is marked by internal organizational changes and external factors,
including government policies, the private sector banking and financial markets, and the market
for social investments from individual and institutional sources.
More about CDFI Organizational Models
Although the most numerous form of community development financial institution
(CDFI), CDCUs and CDLFs are just two of several organizational models that fall into the CDFI
category, which became embedded in federal legislation. There is no one CDFI model, but
13 In order to show changes over time, longitudinal data is ideal, but only results summaries are available publicly
without charge.
several development bank typologies that differentiate CDFIs by financial products,
organizational and legal structures, and capital sources. CDFIs are diffuse, unique, and often
small organizations. According to the CDFI Coalition, a national non-profit organization created
in 1992 that lobbied for the creation of the CDFI Fund,
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are private-sector, financial
intennediaries with community development as their primary mission. While CDFIs share a
common mission, they have a variety of structures and development lending goals. There are six
basic types of CDFIs: community development banks, community development loan funds,
community development credit unions, microenterprise funds, community development
corporation-based lenders and investors, and community development venture funds. All are
market-driven, locally-controlled, private-sector organizations.
CDFIs are distinctly non-governmental, community development organizations. In reality, these
six basic types are not mutually exclusive-organizations can incorporate variations of each type
into the work that they do. Some of the largest CDFIs have developed multi-functional affiliate
structures, which are critical to their growth and scale over time (e.g., ShoreBank in the Midwest
and Pacific and Self-Help Credit Union in North Carolina).
Governmental and private data sources of CDFI information differ considerably in their
CDFI counts. As of January 1, 2006, the CDFI Fund certified 752 CDFIs, 86% of which include
credit unions (146) and loan funds (505), a large majority of certified organizations. CDFI Fund
certification is a requirement if a CDFI wants to participate in the federal government's technical
and financial assistance programs.
Chart 1. Percentage of CDFIs by Category
However, federal certification does Certified by CDFI Fund, 2006
not a CDFI make. The CDFI Data
Venture Capital
Project (CDP) is a longitudinal Funds Banks or Thrifts
3% 7% Credit Unions
data set collected and published by 19%
Institution Holding
a consortium of eight industry Loan Funds Companies
68% 3%
organizations and associations.' 4
According to a 2004 publication,
"the 477 CDFIs in this study [of fiscal year 2003 data] held $13.1 billion in assets and $8.4
billion in financing outstanding. For CDFIs for which we have four years of data (263 CDFIs),
14 Aspen Institute, Association for Enterprise Opportunity, CDFI Coalition, Community Development Venture
Capital Alliance, Corporation for Enterprise Development, National Community Investment Fund, NFCDCU, and
OFN.
financing outstanding grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) or 18%" (CDP 201n
this sample, 89% of CDFLs are credit unions (55%) and loan funds (33%). Clearly, the CDI
Fund and CDP samples vary dramatically in their relative proportions of credit unions andkA
funds. The CDFI Fund is counting credit unions that have applied for and received their
certification while the CDP sample includes credit unions that are members of the National
Federation of Community Development Credit Unions (NFCDCU). The CDP sample cous
members of Opportunities Finance Network (OFN), which represent 31 % of the 505 loan bds
in the CDFI Fund sample.
Why focus on CDCUs and CDLFs instead of all CDFIs?
This thesis focuses on non-profit credit unions and loan funds in order to limit the SOpe
of research and concentrate on organizational models that represent most CDFIs. Accordingte
the CDFI Fund and the CDFI Data Project, credit unions and loan funds account for 86% or89%
of surveyed CDFIs, the vast majority of
Chart 2. CDFIs by Type, 2003
CDFIs, respectively. However, since (Source: COFI Data Project)
government and private data sources Venture Capital
Funds Banks
account for half of the estimated number 4
Loan Funds
33%
of CDFIs operating in the United States,
they may overestimate the amount of Credit Unions
56%
CDCUs and CDLFs among all CDFIs.
CDCU and CDLF Basics
CDCUs and CDLFs have distinct community orientations, which are embedded in their
private non-profit tax status as well as their mission statements, to provide affordable financial
services to low- and moderate-income consumers and communities. Some explicitly target one
or more demographic groups-for example, women, immigrant, or racial and ethnic
communities-for social justice and economic empowerment. Generally, credit unions target
consumer depositors and businesses operating in an area while loan funds, generally, target
organizations, including businesses, community non-profit organizations, or affordable housing
and other real estate developers. Credit unions targeting geographically can range from the
neighborhood to the state while loan funds tend to focus on larger geographical areas. Many
credit unions are formed through an associational bond that includes the workplace,
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congregation, or community. They take member deposits and lend for personal, auto and
mortgages. On the other hand, loan funds are 50 1 (c)3 non-profit organizations that rely on grant
and borrowed funds. Both credit unions and loan funds rely on social investors; however, credit
unions offer market rate returns on savings and certificates of deposits while loan funds often
offer an illiquid product that returns a below market rate and requires more on the social value
placed on the investment by social investors.
CDCUs and CDLFs have different organizational structures, but share the non-profit tax
status. " CDCUs and CDLFs are structured in fundamentally unique ways that are unlike
conventional banks and loan funds: they pay no taxes and in exchange, they focus on low- and
moderate-income people and places. However, they differ from each other because CDCUs are
federally regulated depository institutions and CDLFs are not. Regulations limit the degree to
which depository CDFIs can grow (Benjamin, Rubin, and Zeilenbach 2004). Credit unions were
established with a cooperative, community structure built into the organization: a credit union's
members are its owners. Loan funds can be public, quasi-public, public-private or private loan
funds that have a mission that focuses on community development. Regardless of whether they
are public or private entities, all credit unions and loan funds have a unique public or community
mission, which varies widely in its breadth and depth depending on how and by whom the
organization was founded. However, like all non-profit organizations, they pay no income taxes
and are subject to some degree of public or community control, which is often through board
representation or through an advisory committee.
Community Development Versus Low-Income Credit Unions
There is no strict definition of a community development credit union (CDCU), but it is
important to understand the distinct nuances between them and the low-income credit unions
designated by National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The National Federation of
Community Development Credit Unions (NFCDCU), an advocacy and membership organization
founded in 1974, states that a CDCU is a credit union that meets the following criteria. First,
similar to all credit unions, CDCUs are non-profit and tax exempt, cooperatively owned and
governed, and government-insured. Second, they make fairly priced loans and products to
members with "imperfect, limited, or no credit history," member financial education, and a
15 All credit unions are non-profit organizations; however, CDCUs and CDLFs operate under different 501(c)3
sections.
"commitment to serve the broader community, which it demonstrates through community
outreach, participation in government programs, partnerships with the private-sector in
community revitalization efforts, and/or collaboration with other CDCUs."" As of December 31,
2005, the NFCDCUs counts 220 members that together control $3.4 billion in assets and have
aggregate members numbering 896,000, approximately one percent of membership in all 9,000
plus credit unions throughout the United States."
The NCUA has designated over 1,000 credit unions, or one out of nine credit unions, as
low-income credit unions (LICU). As of January 2006, 1,035 LICUs controlled almost $20
billion in total assets and had over 4 million members or 5% of all credit union membership
nationally. LICU average assets were over $19 million and median assets were slightly over $4.6
million. The designation enables credit unions to accept non-member deposits, a major tool that
enables credit unions to increase their asset base. According to the Pennsylvania Credit Union
Association,
The NCUA's definition states a low-income credit union is defined as one where a majority of its
members either earns less than 80 percent of the average for all wage earners or whose annual
household income falls below or at 80 percent of the median household income for the nation
($33,595). The term low income also includes members who are full-time or part-time students in
a college, university, high school, or vocational school.... To obtain a low-income designation
from the NCUA, an existing Federal credit union must establish that a majority of its members
meet the low-income definition. Majority in this definition means at least 50.1 percent of the
members."
Low-income people do not generally maintain a high average savings balance, so
accepting non-member deposits can expand the capital on hand to increase a credit union's assets
and support more loan activity." Community development advocates argue that a low-income
designation does not necessarily reflect a strong commitment to community development in the
sense that NFCDCU defines a CDCU, especially with respect to student membership. (While
students may earn a modest, or low, income, they have greater future, high-income earning
potential than low-income people, who do not have significant amounts of wealth or are not
pursuing education.) Moreover, LICUs may not offer the community development services
targeted to low-income people that CDCUs offer even though many credit unions offer
16 http://www.cdcu.coop/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=261, retrieved by author April 2, 2006.
"7 http://www.cdcu.coop/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=256, Retrieved April 2, 2006
18 http://www.pcua.coop/cudevelop/lowincome2.htm
11) Author interview, March 2006.
assistance with personal budgeting and credit or home buying and homeownership counseling.
Regardless of what category a credit union falls into, credit unions focus on servicing their
members-in this respect they are people-based and focus only on specific groups of people that
work together, live near one another, or pray in the same church. With respect to assets, they
might focus on either expanding or maintaining their membership, which limits their asset size.
Relative to a bank, which can serve anyone who chooses its services, a credit union provides
services to a group with a common bond. In recent years, regulators have relaxed the rules and
more credit unions are creating multiple common bonds to expand their field of membership)
Thesis Chapter Overview
The introductory chapter sorts out the differences between non-profit CDFIs-with a
focus on LICUs, CDCUs and CDLFs-and offers a brief overview of how CDFIs are related to
the overall community development system, which was created by federal policies and justified
by economic theories of capital market failure. Given these public and private rationales. CDFIs
are financial intermediaries between low-income people and communities, non-profit CBOs, for-
profit businesses, and public sector policies and programs.
The second chapter presents the results from the LICU and CDLF surveys. LICUs and
CDLFs responding experienced growth between the first year of operation and the close of their
most recent fiscal year. The surveys identified four factors associate with large CDFIs:
geographic expansion, customer and product diversification, more debt and equity funding
sources, and a focus on fundraising. These areas help to create an industry profile useful in
comparing LICUs and CDLFs, as well large and small organizations. Differences between large
and small organizations contribute to understanding how organizations have pursued growth in
the past.
The third chapter covers two cases: Opportunities and TRF. The two organizations are
different in fundamental ways but similar in the mission-driven nature of their financial products
and services. Both are recognized leaders in a small industry where asset growth is rare. They are
examples of organizations that have grown successfully, using two additional growth factors:
long-term leadership and creative partnerships. The CDFI industry is still growing; therefore,
20 There is intense lobbying in Congress and regulatory agencies between credit unions and banks that see credit
unions as a competitive threat because credit unions do not pay taxes. Banks favor limitations to the cooperative
model over the corporate model. Credit unions generally have more affluent members than banks; however, this is
only one (albeit desirous) market segment every financial services business covets.
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what constitutes organizational maturity is not well understood and institution building is just
beginning. Opportunities and TRF have achieved varying degrees of scale in geographic focus,
customers and products, financial sources and human resources. Moreover, Opportunities and
TRF offer a microcosm of successes and failures. In other words, they exhibit growth fits and
spurts that mark change in any business or social endeavor.
The final chapter reviews the major findings and presents recommendations for CDFIs,
investors, and policymakers.
Chapter 2. Survey Results:
Growth Factors in Large and Small LICUs and CDLFs
CDFI Asset Growth and Associated Factors
Between their first year and today, low-income credit unions and community
development loan funds increased their assets and simultaneously expanded their target areas,
diversified their mix of customers and investors, and used new products to expand. What is less
clear is the rate at which LICUs and CDLFs are growing annually, if that rate changes in fits and
spurts, and how asset changes interact with other variables. Moreover, both human resources and
changes in relationships are hard to measure, even without trying to account for their interaction
with assets. Counting the number of relationships or categories and number of customers and
investors does not measure the intangible dollars, community economic development synergies,
and social value LICUs and CDLFs promise. While the surveys do not capture every
independent variable in CDFIs-and this study only deals with a few-they help identify factors
that are associated differentially, with large and small LICUs and CDCUs.
Summary of Findings
First and foremost, large low-income credit unions (LICUs) and community development
loan funds (CDLFs) grow by diversifying their customer base and increasing their funding
sources. In addition to diversifying their customer base and funding sources, larger LICUs and
CDLFs target larger geographic areas and populations that enable them to offer a wider array of
products to new categories of customers. LICUs did not have as strong an association between
assets and customers and assets and sources as CDLFs; however, LICUs with 4 or more
customer categories are associated with over 10 funding source categories.2 2 LICUs pool the
savings of low-income members and non-member social investors to supply consumer, business,
and community non-profit loans. LICUs rely on individuals and families as both customers and
21 Differentiating between large and small organizations helps identify if and how these independent variables
contribute to scale. To create balanced samples among large and small LICUs and CDLFs, large LICUs (have
greater than $20 million in assets in the most recent fiscal year while large CDLFs have greater than $10 million in
assets in the most recent fiscal year. For the purposes of this analysis, today is the most recent fiscal year and year
one is the first year of operation when discussing LICUs and CDLFs.
Significant at a 99% confidence level.
funding sources, reflecting the cooperative, member-owner structure of credit unions. Who
qualifies for membership is an important factor because it determines the geographic marka
extent of a credit union. The low-income designation helps these organizations leverage tfr
assets of non-members into lending to low-income communities. On the other hand, CDLh
redirect wealth from a more diverse group of investors-including individuals, religious
institutions, other financial institutions, corporations, foundations, and governments-to
businesses and organizations that operate in or serve low-income individuals and communitis.
LICUs are moving into more lending to businesses and non-profit organizations while CDLs
have always focused on lending to these organizations. (Few CDLFs offer products to
individuals.) However, CDLF have diversified by financing more types of organizations tha
develop affordable housing, community facilities, and commercial real estate than LICUs choose
to target.
CDLFs draw from a wider array of debt and equity funding sources than LICUs do,
mostly because they need to maintain a higher level of equity than a credit union. Large CDLFs
have added more customers and funding sources than small CDLFs, not in shear numbers of
customers, but by category of customer and by category of funding source. CDLFs with over $10
million in assets have 4 or more customer categories and over 10 different funding source
categories. In other words, large CDLFs have managed to diversify either their customer base
or their investor base or both simultaneously as they have increased assets. Interestingly, the
large number of customer categories that a CDLF targets are not associated with a large number
of funding source categories. Regardless, small CDLFs are diversified by customer category and
funding source, but not to the extent of large CDFIs.
Moving away from growth through retained earnings -a slow growth model - CDLFs
are tapping into a broader array of funding sources than LICUs. Some LICUs are expanding their
use of fundraising, but most, unlike CDLFs, are not focused on raising equity or secondary
capital to accelerate their asset accumulation. While it not clear exactly what funding sources are
the largest depositors in dollar amounts, it is clear that religious institutions, banks, corporations,
and state and local governments are playing a larger roll as funding sources for some LICUs, but
most are continue to grow through member deposits. According to a recent publication of the
NFCDCU, a reason for the expansion of funding source categories in credit unions is that some
23 Significant at a 99.9% confidence level.
CDCUs are using affiliated non-profit organizations to fundraise and assume some of the costs
for operations and management, thus making the credit union healthier from a regulatory
perspective, and opening up the organization to move into new customer or product categories.
The survey, however, does not question LICUs about whether they are associated with an
affiliate organization, so there is room for more research into affiliate contribution to asset
growth and organizational scale.
Sample LICU and CDLF Asset Growth
Not adjusted for -
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assets. In the most recent Asset Categories
fiscal year, 85% of LICUs had more than $10 million in assets while only 42% of CDLFs
exceeded $10 million in assets, which reflects a sample bias in the credit unions surveyed. (See
Chart 3 for distribution of assets by LICU and CDLF.)
LICU and CDLF Geography, Population, and Markets
CDLFs have more flexibility to target larger and geographical markets than LICUs. In
other words, the amount of assets does not restrict a loan fund from targeting larger markets,
which one growth strategy dictates. LICUs are constrained from targeting larger geographies and
populations by both regulators and mission. LICUs target smaller geographic areas than CDLFs,
but these geographies can span one or more jurisdictions across dense and populous urban
24 The asset amount from the first year does not take into account inflation. Using the mean age of each sample, we
can create a threshold in 2005 dollars by adjusting for inflation by the Consumer Price Index. The mean and median
first year of operation for loan funds was 1988, so $1 million in 1988 is inflated to $1,622,638.24 (See figure 1.) The
mean first year of operation for credit unions is 1962 while the median is 1957. One million dollars in 1962 inflates
to $5,958,139.
25 This analysis does not adjust for outliers because of the categorical nature of the survey question.
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centers or in rural places. 26 No LICUs survey targeted multiple states or the entire nation and few
were statewide organizations. Most of these started out with a single common bond, whichis less
common today as field-of-membership regulations are looser than they were in the past (because
credit union's can employ multiple common associational and geographic common bonds). A
credit union must modify its charter and have it approved by the NCUA before it can expand its
membership. Today, over 42% of LICUs focus on a single political jurisdiction (city/town,
Chart 4. Percentage by Geographic Jurisdiction, y)
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Credit Union Today 42%/ 33%_/ [ 6% 00% 180% CDLFs focused on a
single jurisdiction today even though almost 35% of the sample started with that focus. Forty-
four percent of the CDLF respondents targeted multiple jurisdictions and another 40% were
statewide or larger organizations. Loan funds are not regulated and determine their target
geography based on their mission and on their prospects for market growth.
In addition to targeting narrower geographies, LICUs target smaller populations than
CDLFs. Eighty-six percent of LICUs started out focusing on markets of less than 50,000 people;
today that number has declined to 43% as LICUs are expanding their fields of membership. Very
few LICUs focus on markets exceeding 2 million people. While CDLFs do not target consumers
directly like LICUs, they focus on larger geographic markets that contain large numbers of
26 Another factor is the urban versus rural nature. CDP data indicates that urban loan funds are generally larger,
which if focused on housing in urban markets, deals can get quite large. Rural markets are thinner on capital wealth
because of population dispersion. Many credit unions operate in rural communities because banks find the cost of
opening a branch there prohibitive. With the advent of the Internet and phone-based banking, it remains to be seen if
credit unions can leverage an alternative to brick and mortar business model that make them look like banks.
(However, after visiting many credit unions in search of email addresses, I can safely say that banks have much
more sophisticated web banking that many credit unions appear to offer.) The best innovation would be if
technology could make it easier for credit unions to offer consumer financial services that build wealth for low- and
moderate-income individuals and families. Unfortunately, credit unions cannot afford to innovate around technology
without grant or subsidies.
people. CDLFs targeting markets covering less than 50,000 people accounted for 5% of the
sample in year one and 6% today. The percentage of CDLFs that target markets between 50,000
and 250,000 people has dropped from 35% in year one to 17%, today while the percentage of
CDLFs targeting more than 2 million people has increased from 20% in year one to 40% today.
In terms of geography and population, there is some difference between large and small
LICUs and a negligible difference between large and small CDLFs. Large and small CDLFs fall
into the same geographic categories in roughly the same proportions; larger LICUs tend towards
multiple jurisdictions. Fifty percent of small LICUs fall into the single jurisdiction category
while 55% of large LICUs fall into the multiple jurisdictions. Today, 11 % of the large LICUs
operate at the state level-5% operate in markets with over 2 million people. While the
percentage of large and small credit unions started off targeting less than 50,000 people was 87%
and 84%, respectively, 64% small credit unions are in the same population category today.
Delineating the sharp range among LICUs, twenty-seven percent of large LICUs target
populations of less than 50,000 people. Most large and small CDLFs target markets in multiple
jurisdictions. The
largest change over Chart S. Percentage by Population (000s),s c Credit Unions and Loan Funds in First and Most Recent
time was a decrease in iYear (rows total 100 percent)
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dropped from 18% to 3% in the same category. Today, large loan funds operate (29%) across
multiple states or the nation at twice the rate of small loan funds (14%).
LICU Customers, Products, and Sources of Funds
While all LICUs offer the same core products, larger organizations offer a wider array of
products and serve more customers than just consumers and homeowners. Today, most large and
small LICUs offer savings accounts and personal loans along with checking accounts (share draft
accounts) and auto loans. In their first year of operation, large credit unions offered checking
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accounts (share draft accounts) at a rate of 5.56% and small credit unions offered the accounts a
rate of 20%. Sixty-one percent of large credit unions and 33% of small credit unions offered auto
loans initially. Other products include Certificates of Deposit (CD) and Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA).
Though they started with the same number of products, large LICUs offer more products
today than small LICUs do. As a credit union grows, it can add more products that require more
capital. For example, residential mortgages are a significant step in expanding a credit union's
capital base because they enable it to originate loans that can be sold on the secondary market.27
A credit union can earn fees for servicing the loan-if they so choose-as well as increase their
lending volume. Today, 94% of large LICUs and 60% of small LICUs offer residential
mortgages. Small business loans and commercial mortgages present credit unions with another
loan product, but unlike mortgages, credit unions will have to maintain the loan in their portfolio.
Today, 55% of large credit unions and 26% of small LICUs offer small business loans while
44% of large and 13% of small LICUs offer commercial mortgages.
While member deposits are the largest source of capital for LICUs by far, large credit
unions utilize these sources at greater rates than small credit unions. This holds true when the
organization was founded through today. LICUs target institutional sources for deposits
including religious institutions, foundations, banks, corporations, and local and state government.
(See figure 5.) While the credit union might naturally attract institutional depositors, credit
unions may choose to actively pursue these depositors as a part of a growth strategy. Large and
small LICUs attracted bank depositors at virtually the same rate (23% and 22%) in their first
years of operation while a greater percentage of small credit unions attracted intermediary
depositors (6% versus 15%) during a comparable period.
Few LICUs are seeking out grant and secondary capital and there is a negligible
distinction between large and small organizations. Technically, credit unions cannot fundraise as
other non-profits can and therefore, credit unions create an affiliate structure that enables them to
attract grant money (NFCDCU 2005). All LICUs can use secondary capital, but many do not use
it. Secondary capital is a debt product that counts as equity when calculating the net worth ratio:
the amount of equity capital to debt. While technically a mid-term loan, the credit union pays
interest only for the duration and the principal at the end of a 5-7 year term. There is also an
27 Author interview, March 2006.
equity roll down by 20% annually every year for the five years before the loan is due. Secondary
capital is a double edge sword: it allows a credit union to leverage its "secondary" equity to build
more debt (deposits/loans), but ultimately a credit union has to grow enough through retained
earnings to return the principal and maintain a healthy net worth ratio.
LICUs that focus on community development and those that are members of the
NFCDCU tend to have a larger number of sources both in their first year of operation and in their
most recent fiscal year. Additionally, these organizations tend to be younger organizations. To
meet a community development mission, these credit unions are reaching out to a greater number
of institutions and using newer financial tools like secondary capital to accumulate assets. Credit
unions that are not diversifying their sources are content to remain reliant on individual deposits
while maintaining their net worth ratio in a slow growth state often advanced by NCUA
regulators.
CDLF Customers, Products, and Sources of Funds
Generally, CDLFs offer fewer consumer products29 than LICUs and concentrate on
lending to organizations, including small businesses, non-profit community development
corporations, and other housing developers. LICUs make small business loans, but loan funds
operate a variety of scales with one or many financing products, usually concentrating on small
business or community non-profit or housing or some combination of both. CDLFs rely upon
more sources of funds than LICUs-they are diversified with debt and equity sources, and to a
lesser extent, secondary capital, which they receive primarily from banks, thrifts and other credit
unions.
Between the first year of operation and today, large CDLFs experienced more growth in
small business and community non-profit loans than small CDLFs. Twenty-nine percent small
CDLFs started with community non-profit real estate loans to 25% of large CDLFs. However, in
the most recently reported fiscal year, 74% of large CDLFs and 60% of small CDLFs offered
community non-profit real estate loans. Today, over half of large CDLFs in the survey sample
offer every product (over eight total products) with over 70% of large CDLFs offering small
business loans, community non-profit real estate loans and community non-profit working
capital loans. While allegorical information from each case study indicated that microenterprise
28 Author interview, March 9, 2006.
29 CDP 2004. Mostly homowner mortgage products.
lending is a line of business requiring some degree of internal or external subsidy for technical
assistance, 60% of large CDLFs and almost 50% small CDLFs offer this product today. Over
60% of small CDLFs offer small business loans and non-profit real estate loans while 40% of
them offer microenterprise loans, community non-profit working capital, and affordable housing
construction loans.
Small CDFIs that are less than $10 million can be stretched to their capital limits with a
big project that creates a less diversified portfolio. Less than 25% of small CDLFs offer
commercial real estate construction and permanent loans, affordable housing permanent loans.
Urban markets can be particularly expensive to enter. As they increase their assets, CDLFs can
move into other products, which have greater financial risk and the potential for greater financial
rewards.
Banks, thrifts, and credit unions, the federal government, and foundations are the largest
depositors in both large and small CDLFs. However, in their first year of operation, large CDLFs
attracted a greater percentage of all other funding sources exceptfor banks, thrifts and credit
unions and the federal government. Part of this may be attributed to CRA credits that banks
receive when they invest in CDFIs as well as CDFI Fund matched investments since the mid-
1990s.
Similar to credit unions, CDLFs accept deposits from individuals, though at significantly
lesser rates than credit unions. Since they do not have depository insurance, CDLFs must attract
and maintain a higher proportion of equity (or net assets) than credit unions to instill investor
confidence in the organization. All CDLFs rely on a broad range of equity contributors.
Foundations, and local, state, and federal governments are the largest investors in both large and
small CDLFs. Though the survey did not make distinction, foundations operate at local, regional,
and national scales, representing an uneven capital flow between regions. Foundations are not
rationale funding sources- grant making can be fickle, supporting only short-term
demonstration projects and best practices. Anecdotal evidence suggests that foundations are
moving away from program-related investments30 in individual CDFIs towards industry
innovations. Today, large and small CDLFs receive grants from contributors in relatively
balanced proportions. Large CDLFs attract a greater percent of federal government, foundation
and individual investors while small CDLFs attract a greater proportion state/local government,
Author interview, March 28, 2006.
banks, and corporations investors The percent of investors by type ranges between 40% and 65%
for both large and small loan funds except for the percent contributions from corporations ( 30 %
large and 48% small) and from national CDFI intermediaries (19% large and 0% small).
Relative Importance of Funding Sources, Financial Mechanisms, and Strategies
Among survey respondents, there was a larger difference of opinion between large and
small LICUs than large and small CDLFs about the relative importance of funding sources to
expanding the organization's financial resources in the past five years. With little differentiation,
all large and small CDLFs ranked all funding sources somewhat to very important to expanding
the organization's financial resources in the past five years. Of course, virtually all LICUs ranked
individuals very important and most other sources somewhat to very important. Smaller LICUs
indicated that the federal government, credit union intermediaries, and banks were more
important to expanding the organization's financial resources in the past five years than large
LICUs.
Equity investments rank high with CDLFs while LICUs focus on membership for
growth. CDLFs rank public and private grants as somewhat to very important to expanding the
organization's financial resources in the past five years while LICUs rank these mechanisms
somewhat to not important. Again, large and small CDLFs were consistent in ranking the
importance of different financial mechanisms-private deposits and grants, public deposits and
grants, retained earnings, and loan sales or securitization. In contrast, LICUs rank private
deposits and retained earnings as somewhat to very important, reflecting a narrow investor focus.
On average, CDLFs ranked strategies important to the organization's financial resources
in the past five years higher than LICUs did. Large and small CDLFs did not differ much in
responding that all strategies were somewhat to very important. The top ranking strategies were
employing experienced staff, applying for and receiving grants, and maintaining formal
relationships with local institutions. On the other hand, large LICUs ranked offering new
products, employing experienced staff, and expanding membership as somewhat to very
important. Though they share a similar opinion on the first two strategies with large LICUs,
small LICUs indicated that maintaining formal relationships and cultivating institutional
investors was more important than expanding membership.
Limitations of Survey
While there are sore statistically significant associations, it is not definitive-let alone
very clear-whether or not one factor contributes to LICU and CDLF asset growth. Indeed, the
categorical nature of the data limits the extent of claims. For example, new products either
enable credit unions to grow or the credit unions were able to offer new products because they
had grown. The interaction is likely more complicated than direct causation because of a web of
factors associated with growth. LICUs are fiscally conservative organizations and must grow to a
certain size before they can offer checking accounts and mortgages.
Survey data does not differentiate among the mismatches between local and regional
economies across space. Nor does it reflect the quality of customers and products. If a LICU or
CDLF is truly devoted to community development, they will target members that push the
bounds of what might be considered a safe bet. For example, high-income people can secure a
loan with their assets while many low-income people cannot. Personal assets, which can be
generally small to begin with, often secure credit for new and small businesses. Non-profits face
short-term cash flow issues if they rely on uneven grant funding and LICUs and CDLFs can fill a
capital gap in affordable housing. In order to lend, LICUs and CDLFs will assume a higher
degree of risk. This can be a tricky balancing act that many CDFIs must master-pursuing a
community development mission while maintaining fiscal responsibility and investment
stewardship.
Lessons Learned
Large non-profit CDFIs do the following:
Target more than one geographic jurisdiction with a large number of potential
customers. All organizations are limited by the size of their target markets, which ultimately
determines the extent of asset scale based on market constraints. Larger target geographies offer
more pathways to scale. Credit union regulations have changed in recent years, enabling credit
unions to have multiple common bonds and focus on more geographic areas rather than before.
Without such regulatory restrictions, loan funds are free to target any market it defines, no matter
what the size of the organization.
Branch out into new customer categories and products. In other words, growth
requires customer diversification along with a large geographic market. Large non-profit CDFIs
are looking beyond individual wealth creation to business and community asset creation that is
more comprehensive (broader) in its community development perspective. Perhaps these
organizations are being more opportunistic. Credit unions continue to focus on low-income
consumers, but they can branch out into business and non-profit lending. Loan funds started off
lending to businesses and non-profit organizations for affordable housing, but can expand by
lending to for-profit developers and for commercial and mixed-use development.
Attract more debt and equity funding sources. A diversification of customer
categories must be balanced with a diversification of funding source categories. Because they are
federally insured, credit unions do not have to retain much equity on their balance sheet-they
are highly leveraged. In other words, individual and institutional deposits are their primary
mechanism for growth, which is built into the cooperative structure of the credit union. The low-
income designation is critical to attracting non-member deposits, which can contribute to an
organization's bottom line if the organization can balance it with financial education and loans to
its low-income members, businesses and community organizations. While this designation is not
available to them, larger CDLFs pull almost equally from multiple debt and grant sources, which
is more important than growing through retained earnings or loan sales and securitization.
Increase number of employees engaged in fundraising work. Larger credit unions
have had a long time to expand their assets through retained earnings and are therefore larger
than most loan funds. However, credit unions must do fundraising work through a non-profit
sponsor because regulations limit the extent of credit union fundraising. Without the regulatory
burdens facing a depository institution, loan funds have grow through external funding rather
than retained earning-fundraising is an important and necessary activity. As CDFIs grow larger,
they can devote more staff resources towards fundraising to meet the costs of cross-subsidizing
different lines of business (especially community development services including technical
assistance, and financial education and counseling), investing developing new loan products and
financial services, and testing new customer markets. In many ways, CDFIs are investing in
themselves and communities through a continuous cycle of internal and external reinvestment.
CDFI scale is limited to the extent that they can encourage and build this cycle, to the benefit of
the organization, low-income communities-its consumer, business, and non-profit customers,
and places-and its public and private investors.
Pitaills
Non-profit CDFIs that want to grow should be aware of the following:
One problem with expanding the geographic market of the organization is that this
expansion might change the nature of CDFI-community relationships. Since credit union
members are owners, losing community control is less of an issue for credit unions than for loan
funds. Moreover, LICUs must retain and expand membership in order to grow. Unlike a credit
union where members own the credit union, loan funds are subject to varying levels of
community control. A CDLF will not grow if the staff and board of directors restrict lending to
businesses and organizations in a small geographic area, especially at the neighborhood, county,
or city level. Ultimately, the decision to expand an organization's target geography is based on
interpretation of the organization's mission to generate wealth and assets for people in a
particular place, whether defined narrowly or broadly. By increasing the geographic scale of an
organization, organizations lose place-specific focus that has always been the hallmark of
community development practices since its roots in the Great Society legislation of the 1960s.
Larger CDFIs focus on a wider array of places than small CDFIs, but ostensibly, they all target
low-income communities that can benefit from their services, but this complicates the issue of
community control and accountability.
Customer and funding diversification may challenge a CDFI's connection to its low-
income constituents-mission shift or creep-making them more attentive to the needs of
sources of funds rather than the needs of community residents. A credit union must be
careful to add new products as long as it does not jeopardize the level of service it provides to its
current customers or significantly alter its mission. Attracting more funding sources to support
lending to businesses and community non-profits that serves its membership should be consistent
with a credit unions community development mission. By focusing on broader customer
categories, a credit union can finance goods and services that improve the quality of life for low-
income people. For CDLFs, the disconnect between communities and loan funds can be
especially wide if an organization targets more for-profit developers and large businesses with
non-community owners rather than community-based organizations and local businesses that are
locally controlled. More and more, CDFIs work in conjunction with banks and other community
development intermediaries to provide financing and technical assistance to businesses, and non-
profit and for-profit real estate developers; all customers must have equal stake and equal access
to the financing and technical assistance a CDFI offers. However, there is little information about
how loan funds balance make trade-offs between their mission-driven lending and their funding
source requirements.
Fundraising is costly and industry boosters (i.e., social investors, banks, and CDFI
economic and political intermediaries) are pushing for market rate investments, which may
lead CDFIs to use subsidy for operating support rather research and development. If
private and public sources of funding pull back from investing in CDFIs-especially in equity
contributions-CDFIs will have to adjust their lending policies to reflect market rate pricing for
the level of risk they assume. In other words, they must become efficient and effective managers
of capital. An equity contributor is not an investor in a CDFI in the business sense, but a grantor
of funds (which may come with some strings attached) in perpetuity. In other words, they are a
social investor in the purest sense because they choose to forgo any economic returns on their
investment. Yet CDFIs attract a wide range of social investors and can attract more by leveraging
their equity with debt investments. A CDFI can always borrow against its equity to achieve a
certain level of assets, but its long-term growth is stymied by the amount of equity it holds. If a
loan fund offers below market rate loans or spend more money in servicing and technical
assistance, they are at risk of slowly losing their capital over time. For some government-
sponsored revolving loan funds, this is expected (Robinson, 200 1). However, if a non-profit
CDFI wants to grow, they either charge more in interest and fees or attract more funding. One
funding source might be critical to short-term growth, but a diversified base may enable an
organization to weather the vagaries of individual and institutional investors over time.
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Chapter 3.
Asset Growth and Organizational Scale:
Opportunities Credit Union and The Reinvestment Fund
Introduction to Case CDFIs
The case studies of Opportunities Credit Union (Opportunities) and The Reinvestment
Fund (TRF) enable a more detailed understanding of how one CDCU and one CDLF have
achieved substantial asset growth as well as comparison of these findings with survey results.
Both organizations share missions with other CDFIs because they offer financial products and
services targeted to benefit low-income individuals, communities, and non-profit organizations.
Both provide retail-banking services-Opportunities primarily to individuals/consumers (and to
a lesser extent non-profit organizations and companies) and TRF to organizations, typical of
most credit unions and loan funds. However, these organizations are not average-they are
leaders among their peers with affiliate structures, more asset growth, larger target markets,
greater diversity of products and investors. They have achieved a degree of industry notoriety as
they push the bounds of what a scaled CDFI looks like. TRF and its affiliates have more assets, a
larger target market, a different set of products, and different set of investors than Opportunities.
Many of these organizational differences stem from the structure of credit unions and loan funds
and each organization's respective position in different urban and rural economic geographies.
Opportunities Credit Union
Between 1989 and today, Opportunities' membership has grown significantly, while it
has increased its number of consumer products, offering mortgages, microenterprise and small
business loans, manufactured home and home improvement lending, and many transaction
products (e.g. checking accounts ATM, ACH). The core client focus remains on banking
services to low- and moderate-income individuals and families throughout Vermont. The first
years were only savings accounts and personal loans; later, the organization offered residential
mortgages, small business and non-profit loans. The addition of Opportunities Ventures (OV), a
non-profit affiliate loan fund, has activated financing for Vermonters with disabilities and hopes
to begin lending to manufactured housing cooperatives' products more typical of a loan fund
than a than a credit union.
The Reinvestment Fund
Since 1986, TRF has expanded its regional client and investor bases as well as offered
additional financing products for various customer markets. Original loan products for affordable
housing construction and community non-profit working capital-the core loan fund-remain a
large part of the organization. In the early years, TRF focused on capacity building non-profit
CDCs -now there is a shift in focus to financing opportunities regardless of operator. TRF has
restructured is technical assistance to community development corporations and shifted its
economic development activities away from small business lending towards larger urban
redevelopment projects and equity investments. Today, more of a co-mingled fund, TRF has
diversified its investments across geographic markets and across industries and introduced new
business financing products, including the Sustainable Development Fund, private equity funds,
and New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) funds.
Summary of Findings: Overview of Factors Associated with Asset Growth
From their founding to today, consistent with other large non-profit CDFIs, Opportunities
and TRF expanded their target area geography and are branching out into more customer
categories and new products while retaining and enhancing their core customers and products
that are economically sustainable. Similar to many community development credit unions,
Opportunities will always focus on its core membership because its goal is to increase assets and
wealth of low-income individuals and families. Financial education and counseling are a large
part of the services that augment its ability to grow. Adding residential mortgages and financing
manufactured housing cooperatives are consistent with this goal-Opportunities Ventures, an
affiliated non-profit loan fund, increases the organization's ability to diversify its product mix.
While Opportunities is experimenting with a new loan fund, TRF has expanded its focus from its
core loan fund to include affiliated venture capital and NMTC subsidiaries, another CDFI Fund
program. Some of these innovations are for-profit ventures, but they are still considered to return
below market rates of return on investment. TRF's loan fund still provides (and has become self-
sufficient at) construction lending and lending for charter schools, community facilities,
' Modeled off of a product pioneered by New Hampshire Community Loan Fund.
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businesses, and some energy-related enterprises. The loan fund is the first source of financing
and has allowed TRF to attract more bank money. In short, TRF is not just a loan fund but a co-
mingled fund that offers debt and equity financing for community development projects. While
staff is intimately aware of how the internal sources are used, a borrower does not necessarily
need to know from what pool of money his or her financing comes.
Opportunities' stakeholder net, if you will, is small relative to TRF's. Vermont is a rural
state with a small, dispersed population. The greater Philadelphia area is one of the most
populous urban agglomerations in the United States. The genesis of each location was small, but
the visions were broader than specific neighborhoods and projects. Opportunities began as a
neighborhood cooperative in Vermont's most diverse urban area (i.e., North End of Burlington)
and grew to a statewide financial organization, servicing members and loans in most Vermont
towns through a CBO partner network. Only recently, it opened its second banking outpost
(technically, not a branch) in Rutland to reach a wider membership market in southern Vermont.
On the other hand, TRF is a multi-state organization that has recently expanded into five states
located centrally between New York City, a global financial hub, and Washington D.C., a global
political hub. TRF is building partnerships with multiple levels of government and expanding
their development financing activities, opening new offices in Baltimore and Washington, DC.
Over the years, Opportunities and TRF have attracted a wide variety of debt and equity
sources, consistent with the third factor in growth and scale. More specifically, government
sources, individual and institutional social investors, and the local banking systems play
important roles. Investments from the CDFI Fund account for a significant portion of
Opportunities' equity and secondary capital. While TRF received substantial grant funds from
the CDFI Fund, it has also attracted grants from state governments and national foundations at a
greater rate than Opportunities. That TRF operates in multiple states with significant economic
agglomerations and dense urban development patterns has surely enhanced its ability to attract
more capital from a wider array of sources. Both organizations are proven social investments,
raising their profile among public and private investors alike. Their ability to organize capital to
support their community development objectives has contributed substantially to their economic
and social bottom lines. Moreover, Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations give all
CDFIs, including TRF and Opportunities, a lever to attract and institutionalize investment
commitments from banks. However, it is clear that the size and scale of local banking system
shapes a CDFI's opportunities, especially if banks have satisfied CRA requirements through
other external relationships (with other CDFIs or banks) or internal mechanism (through their
own community development subsidiary or corporation).
Opportunities and TRF have integrated fundraising and investment mechanisms to
manage the flow of capital from investors to customers. Each organization does more than
simply try to attract grants and donations through fundraising efforts. They are market-based
investment vehicles, which appeal to social investors who might favor market mechanisms over
philanthropic giving to put their money to work to build wealth for low-income communities. To
their credit, Opportunities and TRF are willing to change their organizational and affiliate
structure and use a variety of investment vehicles, creating new business opportunities that
contribute to their double-bottom lines. However, these mechanisms require a more professional
accounting staff, trained in regulatory compliance, and additional investment in information
technology and infrastructure.
Summary of Findings: Other Factors in Growth
While TRF and Opportunities have used the four practices introduced in Chapter
3-geographic expansion, customer and product diversification, more debt and equity funding
sources, and a focus on fundraising-their stories highlight how leadership and creative
partnerships drive organizational change that results in more assets. The case studies highlight
what the survey does not: the story behind an organization's road to scale. The CEOs at both
TRF and Opportunities have led each organization from their respective origins, which offers a
rare long-term leadership perspective. Moreover, these CEOs have built relationships with
private and public sector organizations that give TRF and Opportunities access to more
customers and a wider variety of supporters, investors, and market opportunities, which
ultimately increase each organization's assets above and beyond organizations that fill smaller
market niches. Staff at both organizations has extensive experience in banking and finance
because there are heavy demands for financial accounting and regulatory compliance.
Each organization engages in creative partnerships to spur growth. For example,
Opportunities overcomes a spatial disadvantage of having only one teller branch in a rural state
by offering its services through partner CBOs. Opportunities is creating demand and generating
supply for consumer banking services among low-income individuals by working through
partner community development or social service organizations throughout the state. On the
other hand, TRF has used more non-profit and for-profit subsidiaries to organize new forms of
capital for different kinds of community development enterprises, including venture capital
investments in companies that create jobs for low-income people in urban neighborhoods
throughout the Mid-Atlantic region and new markets tax credit real estate ventures. The
organizations have followed two different roads: one focusing on consumers, and one focusing
on big institutional investments. Yet both partnership strategies have contributed to asset growth.
Mission, Organizational Structure, and Geography
Opportunities Credit Union
In 1989, the Burlington Ecumenical Action Ministry (BEAM) founded Vermont
Development Credit Union (VDCU) to support investment in affordable housing throughout the
state. The credit union opened its first branch in Burlington's Old North End neighborhood,
which suited the credit union's needs for a number of reasons. First, Burlington is Vermont's
largest city with over almost 40,000 residents in 2000. Second, Chittenden County is the state's
largest county with almost 150,000 residents. Third, the credit union was targeting the low-
income residents who were concentrated in the neighborhood and the city. Fourth, many
neighborhood residents were new foreign-born, brought to the state through the federal refugee
relocation program. Though the credit union has truly grown into a statewide organization with
members and loans in most towns across Vermont, it could not pursue a brick and mortar model
of geographic expansion that many credit unions and banks follow. This path was too costly
based on their limited margins.
BEAM had a twenty-year history of social service and affordable housing development
when it founded the credit union. Organizers believed that the credit union was the best model to
create self-sufficient homeowners by "promoting grassroots community investment and self-help
among low-income people."" While their initial operational focus was on Burlington and
Chittenden County, they always strived to be a statewide institution. According to their most
recent bylaws passed (April 19, 2006) by Opportunities board of directors and pending with the
Vermont Department of Banking and Insurance before they go into force,
32 VDCU press documents, 1989.
this credit union is a community development credit union- whose mission is to build wealth,
community and opportunity through a fair and affordable financial system. We strive to give
people of moderate and low wealth the best possible opportunity to live stable financial lives,
avoid overpriced and nonproductive credit and build assets for themselves and their families. We
do this through fair and affordable loans, savings and transactions delivered with our signature
counseling methods, and associated development activities.
In 1999, the 10-year annual report identifies the underlying idea behind the credit union: "that
low-income people and others that society sees as 'high-risk' have initiative, goals, and
determination; they lack only opportunity." In 2005, VDCU picked up on this theme by changing
its name to Opportunities Credit Union (Opportunities). The name change is intended to
distinguish Opportunities and its mission from other Vermont credit unions (e.g. Vermont
Federal Credit Union and Vermont State Employees Credit Union). Though the geographic
neutrality of the name lends itself to expansion to other states, Opportunities has no plans for
interstate expansion and is chartered in Vermont. 3
In 2002, Opportunities created a new structure of dedicated affiliates with two new non-
profit organizations, now called Opportunities, Inc. (01) and Opportunities Ventures (OV).
According to an internal document,
Opportunities Credit Union shares a mission with two affiliates, both incorporated as Vermont
401(c)(3) charitable organizations: Opportunities, Inc. is the group's "umbrella" organization for
planning, fundraising, and advocacy. Opportunities Ventures, Inc. is an unregulated community
development financial institution that provides financial and community development services.
These organizations operate in tandem with the credit union and are critical to its success.
Opportunities, Inc. performs a similar function that BEAM did, yet is much more engaged with
the credit union than BEAM was because development of the Opportunities credit union and
affiliates group is its sole reason for being. BEAM has a much broader mission ("seeking faith-
based solutions to social problems"). OV is a non-profit loan fund that raises and deploys funds
with a different risk profile or contractual requirements tied to the capital. For example, the state
recently granted Opportunities a loan fund for Vermonters with disabilities that the credit union
had serviced for over 12 years. While some of this money can reside on Opportunities' balance
3 Defined in 8 VSA Part 6, Chapter 220 §30101 as "a credit union that serves predominantly low income
members.. .or a credit union that meets the requirements of a community development financial institution"
Author correspondence, May 2, 2006.
sheet, OV raises and houses funds for additional loans to Vermonters with disabilities." These
affiliates buffer the credit union from the high-risk activities of OV. For its part, 01 enables the
organization to raise capital from a wider array of sources and dedicate financial resources
towards this task while OV enables the organization to offer a wider array of products and
expand its customer base. While regulations do not limit Opportunities' field of membership to
one state, they limit lending to Vermont residents.
Despite an initial strategy to grow incrementally through additional branches radiating
from Burlington, Opportunities has remained a single branch banking institution long before
Internet banking started taking bites out of brick and mortar banks. There were two reasons for
this: one, opening new branches was expensive, especially in a largely rural state like Vermont;
and two, Opportunities reached customers through community partnerships with nonprofit
agencies and businesses such as energy utilities and car dealerships. The organization has
recently started sending mobile associates to partner organization offices to meet with new and
existing customers. Opportunities' partners have direct access to Opportunities target market of
low-income people and communities, which enables the organization to have multiple remote
offices without cost beyond transportation. Opportunities opened their second banking outpost in
Rutland in 2005, which provides a more convenient destination for members in southern
Vermont." A 2002 report completed for the Pew Partnership for Civic Change indicates that
VDCU grew successfully because it was "quantitatively but also qualitatively different from ...
traditional financial institutions" where members enjoy an "atmosphere of respect, in which
members could understand the barriers they face without value judgments and each member
could pursue his/her own goals at his/her own pace." 37
Author correspondence, May 2, 2006: "the state made separate loan fund grants to Opportunities Credit Union
and Ventures. The money given to Ventures was money that by federal law had to go to a 501 (c)(3) organization
(which the credit union is not); MOST of the fund that the credit union had serviced for 12 years went there, but part
of it went as a required match to Ventures. The story demonstrates the need to have both types of organizations: the
CU can better raise additional funds (because its deposits are insured), but Ventures is the right structure to receive
the federal grant. We will run the fund "seamlessly" from the borrower point of view."
36 Author correspondence, May 2, 2006: "Opportunities was able to open the Rutland office thanks to grants from
the National Credit Union Foundation Callahan Fund and the Ford Foundation through the National Federation of
Community Development Credit Unions. In the latter grant, we are in partnership with Heritage FCU, a mainstream
credit union based in Rutland."
37 Kolodinsky, et al. (2002). Author correspondence, May 2, 2006: "In fact, what we call "counseling-based
lending" is the ESSENTIAL part of our growth story. We discovered early on that at least half of those who come to
us for loans are not immediately qualified for what they want (e.g. because of excessive debt). We make them
customers by supporting them in the process to become bankable through our signature counseling based lending
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The Reinvestment FunId
In 1986, the Delaware Valley Community Reinvestment Fund (DVCRF) started to make
loans to community non-profit organizations in neighborhoods throughout the Philadelphia
region. It has since operated out of Philadelphia, but had a regional perspective as indicated by
the name and focusing investment in low-income urban neighborhoods in Philadelphia, Camden,
and Chester as well as eight counties surrounding Philadelphia in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
From the beginning, TRF targeted projects and investors in the same regional multi-jurisdictional
level at the nexus of county and state lines (though incorporated as a 50 1 c3 charitable
organization in Pennsylvania in 1986). According to Article 3 of the 1989 Articles of
Incorporation, DVCRF's mission was:
A) To create adequate and affordable housing, to promote energy conservation, to assist in the
formation of worker, consumer, and community owned enterprises, to develop an expanding job
base, to increase access to quality education and health care services, to support affirmative action
for women and minorities, and to engage in other activities which improve conditions in and
strengthen poor, low-income, and minority communities;
B) To make and provide loans, loan guarantees, mortgages, grants and other debt and equity
financing and technical assistance to community controlled institutions, cooperatives and their
members, and to organizations organized and operated for charitable, educational, literary, and
scientific purposes similar to those of the Corporation and that qualify as exempt organizations
pursuant to Section 501c3;
C) To conduct conferences, seminars, lectures, educational sessions, and other public discussions
and programs on issues relating to community reinvestment, socially responsible investment, and
related topics of social concern.
The original articles of incorporation mention a wide array of program areas, the mechanisms it
would employ, and the information it would disseminate. The broad program agenda reflects a
comprehensive assessment of market needs that TRF thought would "improve conditions and
strengthen poor, low-income, and minority communities." In 2000, TRF changed its name, its
mission, and introduced a new brand of organization that dropped Delaware Valley from its
name. The organization rewrote Article 3 of the bylaws to state the mission for "combating
community deterioration, relieving the poor and the distressed, eliminating discrimination, and
lessening the burdens of government." TRF fulfills these social goals by:
A) Functioning as an intermediary between investors who support the purposes of the Corporation
and borrowers whose projects and businesses reduce poverty, create economic opportunity, build
system. There is no shortage of low-income people who need things and would like a loan: the challenge is
converting them into successful paying customers. Without our counseling-based lending we could not have grown
as we have."
wealth for low-income communities and low-income people and support a self-sustaining
environment;
B) Functioning as a lender, investor, and grantor for housing, small business, community services,
workforce development, commercial real estate, and energy conservation projects;
C) Functioning as a source of information and technical advice to public, civic, and private sector
institutions; and,
D) Advancing policy ideas consistent with the mission of the Corporation.
Before the name and mission change, TRF had changed its affiliate structure, removing
technical assistance programs and increasing its share of equity financing: in 1997, TRF created
a for-profit subsidiary and raised $10 million in private equity funds to invest long-term in
businesses that create new jobs for low- and middle-income workers. In 2002, TRF launched
Urban Growth Partners, a second private equity fund, which closed with almost $50 million in
commitments. The first fund is fully vested has returned 50% of its total investments. 8 TRF
earns fees for managing the fund and as an investor, will receive a portion of the proceeds.
In 1999, the organization had three primary financing affiliates: the loan fund, a bank
pool for construction financing, and private equity. Today, the loan fund functions as part of TRF
and has four affiliates, two for-profit and two non-profit. The growth of the affiliate structure has
enabled the TRF non-profit umbrella to capture fees and earned revenue from its subsidiaries as
well as diversify its mix of financing. TRF no longer offers technical assistance to community
development corporations, which was part of its original product mix. Future plans include
starting for-profit real estate subsidiaries in Baltimore and Washington DC.
Asset Growth31
Since 1990, the asset growth rate at Opportunities and TRF has been uneven. The biggest
growth spurts-high rates of asset growth-for TRF (at least its own core assets) were from
1995 to 2000 while Opportunities' biggest growth spurt was from 2000 to 2004. The asset
growth for both organizations has not been linear, but much of absolute numerical growth
occurred in the past five years. In other words, as asset size grew rates of growth were lower in
the past five years than in the growth spurts during the 1990s. From a similar baseline year 1990,
TRF's asset growth outpaced Opportunities by a large margin. At the end of the calendar year
38 Retrieved by author, April 20, 2006 from http://www.trfund.com/financing/venture.capital.overview.htm.
39 Opportunities asset data compiled by author from spreadsheets supplied by Opportunities and NCUA 5300 call
reports. TRF asset data compiled by author from 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2005 annual reports, 2006 prospectus,
and financial statements ending June 30 and December 31, 2005.
2005, Opportunities had $36.6 million in assets, and over $20 million in total loans. Between
1990 and 2006, Opportunities assets grew at an average annual rate close to 25% while TRF's
rate averaged 29%. As of June 2005, TRF managed $93.2 million in total assets, excluding the
Sustainable Development Fund and assets managed by TRF affiliates. For all TRF affiliates,
total capital under management exceeded $250 million in FY 2005. Today, the core loan fund is
still a significant part of the organization, accounting for 50% of the organization's non-profit
total assets and approximately 20% of all holdings by TRF and its affiliates.
Opportunities has relied on non-member deposits and secondary capital as key vehicles
for capital expansion while TRF has relied more on managing capital via affiliates. Opportunities
has remained "well capitalized," according to the NCUA definition, through a period of fast
growth by augmenting its net worth with over $4 million in secondary capital. As of December
31, 2005, secondary capital provided 60% of its net worth of 16.6%. This net worth calculation
includes secondary capital investments, which if removed from the equation, Opportunities net
worth would drop below 7%. Opportunities is the most aggressive user of secondary capital
among all CDCUs. Management recognizes that secondary capital is not an ideal tool for
permanent growth because as it nears maturity its eligibility as net worth erodes and, unless it is
renewed or extended, it must be repaid. To date, Opportunities has been successful in securing
extensions and renewals of secondary capital agreements to retain this vital contributor to net
worth. But this requires some effort-what management calls, "chasing ourselves to keep the
same amount qualifying." Recognizing this challenge, Opportunities is seeking ways to make its
secondary capital "evergreen" (automatically renewing) or even converting it to permanent
equity. Aside from secondary capital, credit unions must grow net assets through retained
earnings, which can take a long time; however, Opportunities has increased net assets through
equity grants from the CDFI Fund, HUD, and the State of Vermont, which has added to net
worth and more total asset growth."
Because it is an uninsured loan fund, TRF must retain a higher net worth ratio than
Opportunities. A typical net worth ratio for a CDLF is 25%.4' TRF has core financing programs
that are nested in an array of non-profit and for-profit funds that contribute to its equity position.
TRF's net worth ratio (excluding SDF and affiliates' assets) has increased from a low of 13% in
40 Author interview, March 9 and Author Correspondence, May 2, 2006.
4' Author interview, March 30, 2006.
2001 and 2002 to a high of 20% in 2005. For total capital under management and net assets, TRF
and its affiliates net worth ratio was declined from a high of 42% in 2001 to a low of 17% in
2005. Ending June 20, 2005, TRF and TRF, Affiliates net assets stood at $23 million and $43
million, respectively.
Since 2000, both organizations have accumulated significantly more assets as well as
changed their organizational focus through name changes, brand development, and retooling
their missions. In this period, TRF has shifted its growth focus from its core non-profit financing
operation, which maintains its dominant organizational position. From 2000 to 2004,
Opportunities continued to grow annually between 19% and 35%. In the same period, most of
TRF's growth occurred through its affiliates-TRF asset growth rates ranged between zero and
13%.
Sources of Funds: Individuals and Institutions
Spanning individuals and institutions, sources of funds at Opportunities and TRF are
diverse, ranging from members and social investors to religious institutions, local governments
to the U.S. government, and foundations to banks. Opportunities and TRF do not operate in a
static funding environment. This forces these organizations to be opportunistic, given available
funding sources and mechanisms. Opportunities' funding base relies much more heavily on
organizational than individual deposits with some of the largest growth in non-member deposits.
Both Opportunities and TRF target individual and institutional social investors. TRF offers
promissory notes to both individuals and institutions and accepts grants, contracts, and
management fees.
Members, Individual Investors, and Religious Institutions
Opportunities has simultaneously increased membership rolls as well as non-member
deposits. Membership at Opportunities grew modestly in the early and mid-nineties, and began
rising more dramatically in 1997, exceeding 5,000 members in 1999 and 10,000 members in
2002. Membership growth has moderated slightly, but by all indications, the credit union should
break 15,000 members in 2006. Today, Opportunities has loans placed in virtually all cities and
towns in Vermont. One third of its members live in Chittenden County, which accounted for
over 20% of Vermont's total population in 2000.2 Most of Opportunities recent asset growth has
42 Author Interview, March 9, 2006 and US Census, 2000.
been in non-member certificates of deposit: almost all large depositors are institutions while
banks and credit unions are the single largest source of deposits." While they were an early and
frequent adopter of secondary capital, this source is declining as a share of total assets. Member
deposits account for 28% of total assets and nonmember certificates of deposit account for 39%
of total assets.4
At TRF, individuals and religious institutions account for the largest number of investors,
but banks and foundations comprise the majority of investment dollars. Banks are the most
important investors for TRF-they account for over half 2005 current and non-current loans
payable with over $30 million. Foundations account for $10 million of debt about twice the
amount of individuals and religious investors. While growing in number, civic organizations,
corporations, and government agencies are a small share of TRF's loans payable. TRF's 2005
noncurrent loans payable were 30% due to JP Morgan Chase (for the Collaborative Lending
Initiative, a revolving loan fund of pooled bank capital for housing development), 30% due to
other banks, 17% due to foundations, over 7% due each to individuals, to religious institutions,
and to civic organizations, corporations, and governments.
While religious institutions' investments are a declining percentage of the total number of
investors at TRF, a constant number of congregations still maintain their stamp of approval on
TRF. Individuals were 73% of all investors in FY 2005. The number of banks has remained
constant since 2000, while the number of foundation investments increased slightly. The largest
growth in investors is from 38 organizations in FY 2000 to 57 organizations in FY 2005. Among
investor markets at TRF, there is numerical growth among individuals and among organizations.
Does this mean that TRF has reached its limits in stable investor segments, including religious
institutions and banks? It is a plausible theory, but would require more analysis of religious
institutions and banks in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Washington DC.
Religious organizations are local in nature while banks are not.
43 Author correspondence, May 2, 2006.
44 Opportunities addendum, May 2, 2006: "We and other depository CDFIs are somewhat frustrated by the
$100,000 "glass ceiling" on deposits. Some of the high-performing RLFs have been successful in getting large
investors to grow with them, increasing the amounts they invest in the RLF. Even our enthusiastic depositors tend to
have institutional reasons why they will not go above the lOOK insured limit. This means that as we grow we must
find more and more different depositors."
CDFl Fuind aind Other Investors
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, both Opportunities and TRF received significant
investments from the CDFI Fund, including funds for technical assistance and financial
assistance from the matching fund. The CDFI Fund granted $1.5 million and awards another
$1.5 million in secondary capital to Opportunities between 1997 and 2002. Technical assistance
grants totaled $167,000 for capacity building. Between 1996 and 2002, TRF received
substantially more grant and debt financing from the CDFI Fund than did Opportunities: $8.5
million and $1 million, respectively. TRF's net assets increased from $2 million in 1995 to $15
million in 2000 to $12 million in 2002. TRF net assets have nearly doubled since 2002 while
Opportunities exhibits a near constant level of net assets, showing that the CDFI Fund capital
does not determine the level of capital expansion in TRF than it did in Opportunities. From 1995
to 2002, the CDFI Fund grants accounted for 85% of the growth of net assets and seemed to have
cushioned TRF from large losses ($3 million from 2000 to 2002).
Both Opportunities and TRF attract grants from national foundations, but it remains
unclear how the timing and amounts of these grants has contributed to asset growth and
organizational change. While there was little information available about equity contributions
over time for either organization, each periodically receives grants that are either converted from
debt or earmarked for specific financing programs or research studies. For example, the
Department of Education has issued TRF grants for charter schools while the state of
Pennsylvania is currently granting funds for supermarkets statewide. Opportunities, Inc. has
received research and other grants from the Aspen Institute, Fannie Mae Foundation, Ford
Foundation, Vermont Community Foundation, and John Merck Fund.45 TRF foundation
investors span local and national organizations, including Pew Charitable Trusts and William
Penn, Ford, Fannie Mae Foundation, and MacArthur." Unlike TRF, Opportunities does not have
an extensive network of foundational investors close by, nor does Vermont contain nearly as
45 Author correspondence, May 2, 2006: "Technically, the credit union cannot receive grants from most foundations
because it is not a 501(c)(3) organization except for National Credit Union Foundation, which has funded our work
in affordable mortgage lending and our statewide expansion."
46 FY2005 Annual Report, The Reinvestment Fund.
many high net worth individuals as live in PA, NJ, DE, MD and DC. This gives TRF a
significantly larger pool of people and institutions to target than Opportunities.4 7
Uses ofFunds: Customers and Products
Both Opportunities and TRF have leveraged customers and products in different ways.
Opportunities has primarily expanded through depositor customers, both by expanding
membership and member savings and also by bringing in nonmember deposits." Opportunities
has captured 15,000 members relative to their target population of Vermont's 100,000 low-
income and underserved households, or 40% of the adult population (approximately those at
80% of median income or less). Opportunities is expanding its products a little while the
customer/product mix has been more important to TRF. TRF is expanding into charter schools
and supermarkets, and moving from small business lending to equity investing. TRF has possibly
been more opportunistic than Opportunities in pursing markets where it can raise significant
capital. Another alternative is that TRF is embedded in a dense urban market where there are
more and different opportunities for sources and uses than in Opportunities' decentralized rural
population.
Opportunities offers consumer banking products, mortgages, and personal loans. In a
very real and tangible way, Opportunities' members and investors are also Opportunities'
customers and owners. On the other hand, TRF investors are usually not the recipients of TRF
financing products other than a promissory note. TRF investors earn a return on their investment,
but it is not a market rate return, and can choose a range of returns from zero to four percent. On
the other hand, TRF borrowers tend to pay market rate or above. In simple terms, TRF is
borrowing at below market rates and lending at market rates to earn a margin to support its
operating activity. Grants and contracts also fuel this activity, especially in terms of policy and
planning. In terms of interest rate, Opportunities, as do many credit unions, offers better rates
Author correspondence, May 2, 2006 on three "differences between grant funding at Opportunities and most
CDFIs:
1. Depositories have a high rate of financial self-sufficiency (circa 90%, compared with a more typical 50% at
CDLFs). This means we are less expert at cultivating grant sources and that we are limited in the matching
grant funds we can show to obtain CDFI awards (which require a 1-1 match).
2. The State of Vermont has a very limited budget. In larger states, CDFIs have received substantial state grants.
Opportunities has never received operational funding, although we have received capital grants for specific
loan programs (Working Wheels, Independence Fund).
3. There is no major local foundation in Vermont. Many other CDFIs have received major support from
geographically based foundations."
Author Interview, March 9, 2006.
than banks on savings accounts and certificates of deposit. However, Opportunities operates with
little margin. Rather than retain more equity, Opportunities passes equity gains on to its members
by providing more affordable services. To some extent, Opportunities pays for the higher cost of
its counseling-based services with grants from HUD and other sources.4 9 In other words,
Opportunities provides more affordable financial services to low-income individuals. Some
credit unions face competition from predatory lenders, which often charge rates that take equity
assets from individuals rather than help individuals retain and increase equity assets.
TRF offers debt financing for affordable housing, community services, economic
development, and commercial real estate and equity financing for business and real estate
through for-profit venture and NMTC funds. TRF's equity financing has driven total capital
under management since 2000-the loan fund remains approximately 50% of TRF's $114
million in total assets at the end of calendar year in 2005 while the total capital being managed
by TRF exceeded $250 million. The loan fund concentrates on lending to organizations for
affordable housing, community facilities, charter schools, and small businesses. Recently, TRF
has scaled back it's lending to small businesses for one of the reasons it stopped running the
community development institute: it proved too costly, especially considering its scattered
impact among single entrepreneurs. Any jobs created likely went to the entrepreneur's family.
Moreover, there were no multiplier effects, or synergy with other TRF investments in real estate
and community. Though the supermarket initiative is still debt financing for businesses, it is
larger than past TRF loans, which ranged from $25,000 to $500,000. Currently, TRF's jobs
strategy lies with its equity funds and its healthy construction lending business. In its real estate
lending, TRF's loan fund is financing larger deals.i0 TRF is achieving a degree of administrative
scale: each transaction requires the same operating costs. In other words, in order to achieve
more impact, they must do larger deals.
Organizational Culture, Leadership, and Management
Most staff, board and industry professionals pointed to organizational leadership as a
leading factor that created the right synergy of depositors, products, partnerships, and other
investors. Opportunities and TRF are similar in that they have had the same CEO since the
4 Author correspondence, May 2, 2006.
50 Author interview, March 28, 2006.
founding of the organizations in 1989 and 1985, respectively. Retaining the same leader creates
organizational continuity and institutional memory. Both Caryl Stewart and Jeremy Nowak
proved capable of managing a growing organization through various stages of growth. As one
TRF interviewee put it, "Jeremy is scalable"-as an Opportunities interviewee put it, "You need
a visionary to start a CDFI."' Yet if organizational leadership is a large driver of growth, then
there are few leaders in the CDFI industry that have taken their organization to a significant size.
At both organizations, it is a constant struggle to attract and retain talented people to operate the
business as well as maintain a culture of growth that requires "temperament, vision, passion and
the ability to manage ambiguity." Jeremy Nowak goes on to say "from the beginnings of the
field we carried ourselves like we were going to grow. Some people on board that were nervous,
which is the problem with social justice and its focus on marginality and nothing else. Purity,
substituting process for trust ... For us, growth was meeting the ambition of the mission and
good stewardship. Ultimately, it's a political culture issue. Some organizations have a narrow
view of loans, that they only meet certain criteria." 2 Staff manages a variety of funds in a
complex structure consisting of multiple companies with each compliance requirements. This
demands systems-oriented people that are versed in compliance issues. Financial and accounting
staff must have the credibility to get and manage broad array of financial pools. 53 Other TRF
interviewees indicated that people have to understand both the mission and business sides of the
organization-those who don't, tend to move on. According to a TRF board member,
staff takes advantage of opportunities and always looking for new opportunities... Some things
they've passed on... TA portion cancelled because it was so labor intensive and we were not sure
if we were making an impact. We asked ourselves: can you do more with less-instead of one
staff person working on 21 units of housing, what about 100 units? Now, no involvement in direct
deals, but using developers that have good track records and get things done.
Opportunities recently reorganized some of its management because "money growth was
ahead of its staff growth."" Both Opportunities and TRF have a highly professionalized
staff-as non-profits they pay decent wages, but no one will get rich working for either
organization. CDFIs function in two worlds that are seemingly incompatible: banking and social
Author interview, March 28, 2006.
52 Ibid.
5 Author interview, May 4, 2006.
5 Author Interview, March 29, 2006.
Author Interview, March 9, 2006.
justice. As the industry grows and matures it remains to be seen whether or not CDFIs will
become a haven for displaced bankers or a haven for activists seeking a more market-based
mechanism for asset development and wealth creation for low- and moderate-income and
minority communities.
Creative Partnerships
TRF and Opportunities have formed many partnerships with many different kinds of
individuals and organizations that I) help the organization reach new customers and markets; 2)
generate general loan/investment growth; and 3) supply new capital. For example, Opportunities
partners with community-based organizations, which falls primarily into the first category.
Opportunities maintains partnerships with community organizations and social service agencies
throughout Vermont because they are in direct contact with the low-income people the credit
union targets for membership. While Opportunities gains members to expand its assets and
deploy its financial education and lending, the partners find that they are able to offer a wider
array of support services, including, among others, money management and credit repair.
The second category includes retained earnings and more financial and other contract
management fees. TRF manifests more activity in the second category relative to Opportunities,
but it is unclear how market opportunities have shaped partnerships versus organizational
opportunism to expand partnerships across jurisdictional borders. TRF has focused on
government contracts at national, state, and local levels while Opportunities has limited
government and foundational contracts for research and policy services. Not only has the support
of local, regional, and national institutions have been critical to organizational growth, but also
this support serves to legitimize and reinforce an organization's position as a trusted institution.
Both TRF and Opportunities relate to customers, to investors, to policy makers, and to each other
through national intermediaries. Because they cannot achieve rapid asset growth from within
they need to leverage relationships and create partnerships that contribute directly to their asset
base.
The third category includes debt and equity partnerships that bring new institutional
sources of capital to projects, programs, or at the organizational level. TRF focuses on equity and
debt sources of capital that are diversified among a wide array of local and national
organizations. Opportunities has a similar base with growth weighted towards debt over equity
because greater leverage equity brings. For example, TRF manages a pool of bank money to lend
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for affordable housing. This relationship is mutually beneficial: it bolsters TRF's balance sheet
and enables it to fulfill its mission, while banks receive CRA credits. Additionally, TRF has
gained a fluency in markets that engenders investor trust, especially among institutions with
significant resources and interests in the same markets that TRF operates in, that TRF can
achieve what it says it can. Both Opportunities and TRF strive to be efficient social investments
with good self-sufficiency and high reinvestment rates." One challenge that Opportunities faces
is that Vermont lacks foundations and a large number of wealthy social investors; therefore, it
has built political relationships with Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman Bernie Sanders,
which have helped secure public funds on a national and state level. Managing the state's money
in a responsible and efficient manner helped Opportunities receive granted. However, Caryl
Stewart remarked, "Public dollars don't like to leave public coffers." 7 While the CDFI Fund has
been important to growth for many CDFIs across the country, the current federal administration
threatens its budget, which makes it difficult for small CDFIs to grow because the CDFI Fund is
a large provider of equity capital (Dymnski, 2005; Benjamin, Rubin, and Zeilenbach, 2004).
Partnership categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, the very nature of its
geographic market requires that TRF manage relationships with multiple states and local
jurisdictions. Today, it uses information not to prove old markets, but to enter different ones (i.e.
Baltimore and Washington DC). 8 While Opportunities must wait for the political relationships to
mature and swing back towards investment in CDFI growth financing, TRF can take advantage
of new partnerships as they present themselves. TRF operates across one of the densest urban
agglomerations in the world and can participate in more transactions, whether it drives them or
not. For example, if the political situation in one jurisdiction makes it difficult for TRF to
achieve its goals, it can refocus its efforts on another place. Part of TRF's mission is "to lessen
the burdens of government," which can become burdensome to the organization. However, TRF
has positioned itself as a knowledge and information leader, winning contracts from the city of
Philadelphia to construct a spatial analysis framework for Mayor John Street's Neighborhood
Transformation Initiative and from the state of Pennsylvania to study mortgage foreclosures in
56 Author interview, March 9 and 28, 2006. While information was not available for Opportunities, TRF investors
reinvest at a high rate: over time the annual rate has averaged 80% and in the past five years, it has ranged between
78% and 94%. By including reinvestment in its name, TRF may have encouraged a higher rate of reinvestment from
the get go. The 1992 annual report indicates that the reinvestment rate was 95%.
57 Author interview, March 9, 2006.
58 Author interview, March 28, 2006. One of TRF's mottos is "leading with information."
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Monroe County. TRF secured these contracts because of its ability to produce valuable
information, which has raised its institutional profile where it is seeking to create institutional
permanence not in terms of asset scale, but in terms of what the organization believes is socially
optimal.
Case Limitations
In many ways, Opportunities and TRF today are a migration and evolution from their
original foundings. What is not so clear is the extent to which their mission has changed and
whether their stakeholders-community, clients, and investors-perceive this as a positive
evolution. Both organizations have retained the same founding executives, so senior leadership
had yet to roll over for the first time in the organization's history. Neither organization had
developed specific plans for transfer of leadership should either CEO retire or suddenly pass
away, which was surprising because many interviewees indicated the importance of having a
visionary leader who was able to manage asset growth, build relationships, and partnerships
beneficial to driving both demand for and supply of capital.
Opportunities and TRF manifest a growth perspective that is not focused on assets, but on
impact and wider provision of products to a wider range of customers. Asset growth is
secondary, or dependent, to their public mission and community orientation that are unique
conventional financial institutions and among many other development banks. While it is clear
that Opportunities and TRF have achieved scale in their own markets and in their own right, both
organizations adapted non-profit and for-profit models of community development finance to
expand their products and serve more customers. TRF is continuing to expand its market
geography while Opportunities is maintaining its focus in Vermont. Opportunities is expanding
its products a little while the customer/product mix has been more important to TRF. While both
TRF and Opportunities have maintained a focus on more traditional individual social investors,
TRF has built more institutional relationships with funding sources than Opportunities, perhaps
because of variations in market opportunities for partnerships. TRF and Opportunities have
formed many beneficial partnerships though it is not clear how TRF and Opportunities leverage
human capital and partnerships to contribute to social and economic returns to scale.
Additional Lessons Learned
Opportunities and TRF demonstrate some key lessons, beyond those unveiled in the survey, for
how CDFIs achieve scale:
External opportunities and creative partnerships with CBOs, customers, investors,
and policy makers stimulate organizational change and growth. To achieve scale, CDFIs
must be on the look out for new opportunities to change the organization-they are opportunistic
and entrepreneurial. While most of the lessons learned in chapter 3 focused on what the
organization can do to change policies or procedures internally, they must also look for external
opportunities. This requires sound market assessment of customers and social investors as well
as good relationships with governmental actors and other financial institutions (e.g., banks,
insurance funds, etc.). CDFIs are institutionally embedded in regional banking and community
development systems, so they must balance and satisfy the needs of all current and prospective
stakeholders if they want to sustain their current loan products and community development
services. If they want to grow, they have to diversify by institutionalizing more relationships
with stakeholders. For example, Opportunities must pull from a wide range of social investors if
they want to continue to increase non-member deposits because most investors do not exceed the
$100,000 insurance limit.
Shape market economies by influencing government policy. In turn, market
economies and government policy are the context in which they operate, but CDFIs are not
always passive to economic or political conditions. With bigger social and economic bottom
lines, a CDFI raises its institutional profile to exert pressure on policy makers for changes to the
market for banking and financing in low-income communities. Unlike profit-motivated banks
that would rather generate internal wealth rather than create external wealth, non-profit CDFIs
have public missions to provide financial services to low-income people and places that will help
build individual and community assets that are external to the organization. However, like banks,
they push policy initiatives to shape their market opportunities for internal growth. In other
words, TRF and Opportunities act in their own self-interest to enhance their profits like banks,
but unlike banks, they direct profits towards low-income customers through community
development and financial services.
More Pitfalls
Non-profit CDFIs that want to grow should be aware of the following:
Organizational change does not predict asset growth because there is a risk of
failure. Success and failure are two-sides of the entrepreneurial coin, but with a diverse
constituency of customers, investors and policy makers, CDFIs can hedge their bets. In other
words, if one initiative fails, there are still others to fallback upon, including those sustainable
and self-sufficient (usually original or core) products that enable a CDFI to diversify its
constituency in the first place. For example, TRF did not maintain small business financing or
CDC technical assistance programs because they were did not bring in revenue nor was it clear
what the affects of these programs were. However, construction lending for affordable housing
provides a sustainable base on which the organization can test new ideas and programs.
CDFIs need to balance social and financial goals as they grow, two practices that
have come into conflict in the past. While CDFIs look like community development or social
service agencies, advocating for the social and economic rights of low-income communities, but
use the tools of capitalism. Yet the practice of bank capitalism is often blamed for contributing to
neighborhood deterioration through discriminatory practices (e.g., mortgage discrimination
through "redlining" a neighborhood, usually non-white, white ethnic, and poor communities) that
only compounds poor economic opportunities for low-wealth communities. However, with
modest public funding, market-based organizations like Opportunities and TRF can fill a niche
that supports a fair and affordable financial system for low-income communities. However, in
TRF's case, the organization deals with more complicated financial structures and building
relationships with more state and city governments, testing the limits of what a community-based
organization is. If it casts it's net over all urban, low-income communities between Northern
New Jersey, Pittsburgh, and Washington DC, how can it build ties to new low-income
communities as well as maintain ties to low-income neighborhoods in Philadelphia and in
Camden where it made its initial investments? TRF's experience is one of organizational
maturity as a non-governmental agency that financing wealth and asset creation in low-income
communities that is removed from the dominant neighborhood-based model of community
development. Focusing on one neighborhood, municipality or even one region has not been
enough for TRF, but part of its poverty alleviation strategy.
Despite their non-profit tax status, each organization has the opportunity to grow through
revenue. The more a CDFI does this, the more it looks like a business, and the less it looks like a
community development agency. CDFIs are socially responsible businesses, not because they
engage in charitable or philanthropic endeavors, but because the foundation of their business is
helping low-income people and communities build wealth and assets. There are many
organizations focused on poverty alleviation, but for CDFIs, building assets in low-income
communities does not follow a welfare model (e.g., government transfers or payments like food
stamps and housing vouchers), which can create dependency on transfers or payments rather than
encourage economic self-sufficiency and independence. Neither are they rooted in a
philanthropic or charitable model of giving. CDFIs are rooted in the belief that low-income
communities are sound investments if given effective support systems (i.e., technical assistance,
counseling-based lending, etc.). Community development services distinguish CDFIs from
conventional banking and lending institutions; however, not all customers need these services.
Theoretically, if customers no longer need these supportive services, for-profit enterprises might
begin to service these customers. While some in the CDFI industry might squabble about
whether to focus on the poorest of the poor or more moderate-income customers, all CDFls are
experimenting with market-based mechanisms to alleviate the individual and community effects
of poverty (i.e., few individual and family assets, little access to affordable credit and financial
services, physical deterioration of buildings, etc.).
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Chapter 4.
Conclusion
Revisiting the Findings, Lessons, and Pitfalls
CDFIs are increasingly important private sector, market-based institutions that finance
community development in lieu of diminishing public funding for poverty alleviation and bank
deregulation that threatens the effectiveness of CRA. The CDFI model leverages government
spending into private market initiatives, creating a new market of CDFIs, customers, and
investors. Asset growth helps CDFIs diversify their products to include more categories of
customers in order to reach a sustainable level of scale, which is near self-sufficient. As non-
profit organizations, CDFIs are never completely self-sufficient because their ability to earn
revenues is hindered by their small size and ability to create new capital relationships that
achieve their mission and build the organizations assets and capacity. Despite national policies
supporting CDFI development and the proliferation of CDFIs in the 1990s, few organizations
have achieved a scale that manifests a high level of self-sufficiency and impact. Studying what
factors and practices have contributed to the asset growth of large CDFIs can help all CDFIs
shape their growth perspective and explore new alternatives to their current market geography,
customer and product niches, investor focus, and capital and risk management policies. A
CDFI's mission shapes how it changes in all of these areas, which impacts social outcomes along
with the bottom line, measured in total assets. The challenge for CDFIs is to mediate local and
national markets for financial products and services that are plagued by spatial investment
mismatches, regional economic variation, and ongoing transformations in infrastructure, and
delivery systems in the wider banking industry.
According to the survey results, large CDFIs exhibit more geographic expansion, larger
customer and product diversification, more debt and equity funding sources, and a greater focus
on fundraising than small CDFIs. Survey results indicate that a greater number of customer
categories and funding sources are associated with large CDFIs than with small CDFIs. Client
and investor markets are inherently related, yet there are still complexities about how CDFIs
develop and nurture these relationships, which are often built over a long period that the research
only hints at in the case studies. Human capital is an important part of partnerships forged though
human contact. Industry wide data offers little insight into typical CDFI growth paths conceived
of and implemented by a small universe of community development finance professionals."
More importantly, aggregate data and surveys do not make distinctions between market
economies where CDFIs conduct business. Relative comparisons of CDFIs will always need to
be adjusted based on factors shaped by location. Moreover, the CDFI industry is too small and
fragmented to reliably test for statistical differentiation.
The case narratives add more contours to the story of asset growth and organizational
scale that show the value of long-term leadership and creative partnerships. Both TRF and
Opportunities are moving to make their institutions permanent, embedding the organizations in
regional political, economic, and community development systems. A looming challenge both
face is a transfer of leadership, which neither organization has experienced but both are
preparing for by investing in information infrastructure and human resources. While leadership
change may cause a skip in asset growth, both organizations are at a scale that virtually
guarantees their continuance in some form or another because of their deposit and investment
portfolios.
Reconunendationsfor CDFIs
- Target a large geographic area with a large population. Even though a CDFI might
start targeting local markets, this does not preclude the organization from having a
broader outlook that incorporates all low- and moderate-income customer and
organization markets in a state or a region. Balancing local needs with regional social and
economic forces is a challenge that growing CDFIs will have to meet head on, but a
CDFI asset growth and organizational is limited by the size of its target market area.
" Diversify customers and products connected with mission. Diversification enables
CDFIs to test new community development enterprises, which will increase their
organizational experience as well as expose them to new funding, government, and CBO
partnership opportunities.
- Build and develop investor and funder partnerships across multiple sectors. This is
linked to the above recommendation, but is a different starting point. What are the
funding and partnership limits of each line of CDFI business in a given target market
According to CDP 2004, there are over 6,000 full-time employees in the universe of 477 CDFIs surveyed.
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area? For TRF, even though they invest in urban areas, their regional perspective enables
them to draw funding from a regional community of investors.
Experiment and use affiliate structures. The costs with starting a new affiliate can be
high if your goal is to grow this economic unit. The asset balance of Opportunities
Ventures fund is small relative to credit union assets, which is intentional. TRF has
organized several venture capital funds that use more and more assets as they build their
investment track record over a long period of time. The loan fund itself is becoming a
smaller part of the organization's total capital under management.
Recommiendaions for Investors
Need for stable long-term financing that mixes grants and debt. Every CDFI requires
a large base of grant contributions to grow-this is a primary factor in limiting an
organization's asset scale because they can only acquire as much debt as their net worth
will allow. Therefore, investors need to provide flexible funding according to the CDFIs
community development mission. CDFI investments are below market rate investments
that support financing programs and enable the organization to earn more revenue to
become self-sufficient. But, by their very nature, no CDFI will become compictely self-
sufficient if they desire to increase assets to expand social outcomes.
- Revisit structure of secondary capital. Secondary capital is not a good tool for credit
unions because of the equity roll down, which forces organizations to add more
secondary capital (or equity) or scale back its debts to maintain a healthy net worth ratio.
This structure encourages asset accumulation and asset decumulation, a cycle of booms-
busts, if the organization cannot find enough funding support.
- Support stable leadership and technology through planning (i.e., become a partner
not just an investor). Fundamental to this recommendation is that investors have to
acknowledge that CDFIs require financial, social, and human resources to grow. CDFIs
do not earn enough revenues to support research and development critical to diversifying
their customer bases and introducing new products. In addition to accepting higher levels
of investment risk and lower returns, an investor can contribute time and technical
support that will both help CDFIs grow and become more sustainable, which in turn,
makes CDFIs more stable and reliable investments.
Reconunendations for Policymakers
Maintain and expand grant funding. The CDFI Fund financial assistance component is
a much smaller program than NMTC."' NMTC offers opportunities for larger community
development investments that can benefit an organization financially through
management fees, but they are project specific investments that many CDFIs do not have
the capacity to manage because of the significant resources required to apply for, deploy,
and report. A small organization needs direct grant support and the CDFI Fund must be a
significant investor in community development organizations rather than in projects. In
reality, the CDFI Fund should do both, recognizing the need to balance for-profit project
enterprises with non-profit organizational support. Beyond federal CDFI programs, states
should invest in CDFIs and encourage more legislation modeled on CRA. For example,
in California, "COIN was established in 1996 at the request of the insurance
industry as an alternative to state legislation that would have required insurance
companies to invest in underserved communities, similar to the federal
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) that applies to the banking industry."" This
public-private initiative offers insurance companies tax credits for investments in
CDFIs. Other states should follow this model for insurance as well as banking and
pension sectors.
- NCUA should revise and restructure secondary capital. Secondary capital is debt
capital that counts as net worth until a point at which it rolls down, forcing a credit union
to scale back its leverage. This leads to a boom-bust cycle that is difficult for a credit
union to manage if it wants to sustain assets and grow. Tax credit incentives to secondary
capital investors would encourage more investment and ensure the long-term availability
of the source. With the term maturity, current investors are tempted to remove their
investments on which they are earning a below market rate of return. Supplemental
60 Since 1996, cumulative budget appropriations for direct CDFI financing by the CDFI Fund stands at over $700
million, a small economic base from which many CDFIs are expected to grow. However, the CDFI Fund is in the
midst of dispersing $8 billion in tax credits to for-profit community development entities, some of which are CDFI
subsidiaries (and banks and other investment institutions). The tax credits, which are awarded through a highly
competitive process, can contribute significant amounts of equity to an organization; however, the legal and
accounting complexities might preclude small CDFIs from using this federal program. Most projects are real estate
projects (CDFI Fund, 2005; Dymnski, 2005).
61 Retrieved by author, May 21, 2006 from http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0200-industry/0700-coin/index.cfm.
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incentives from federal funding sources like the NCUA or CDFI Fund can help pay back
the investment through public investments. For example, a seven-year secondary capital
investment will earn interest regularly, but the equity rolls down 20% each year.
Removing this equity roll down would enable credit unions to maintain a healthy net
worth (and debt leverage). Currently, secondary capital principal repayment occurs at the
investment's maturity. An alternative policy option would be for secondary capital
investors to receive tax credits each year of the investment. Once the investment was paid
down through tax credits, it would become permanent capital on the CDFIs balance
sheet.
A Final Word
Because growth is important to any business, understanding CDFI growth can help
CDFIs understand the business they are in. Despite their non-profit status, CDFIs are businesses
that generate economic profits. Unlike a for-profit corporation that directs profits to shareholders,
CDFI profits are directed towards community development programs or expansion of financing
programs. However, this path to scale is slow. If an organization has reached a sufficient degree
of scale, it operates at the nexus of client and investor markets, matching diverse funding sources
with borrowers left out of the economic mainstream, matching capital supply with capital
demand. External sources of equity and debt are critical to CDFI growth. This bridging and
intermediary function does not foster a parallel system of marginalized markets, but encourages
banking and financial relationships among institutions embedded in regional economies,
increases the availability of consumer banking services, bolsters the effectiveness of primary and
secondary financial markets, and contributes to better federal, state and local policies.
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Appendix 1.
Summary of Survey Samples and Response Rates
The survey response was stronger among CDLFs than LICUs even though CDLFs
constituted a smaller target population. Thirty-five of 247 LICUs responded to the survey at a
rate of 14% and 65 CDLFs responded at a rate of 45%. Using the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) asset and contact data yielded 317 websites for the 400 credit unions
with the most assets. LICU websites yielded 247 total email addresses, most of which were
general contact email addresses (166) rather than unique people (81). All targeted LICUs
exceeded $5 million in total assets. Compiling a list of CDLFs proved easier because as of
January 2006, 141 CDLF email addresses were available through Opportunity Finance Network,
a membership and financing intermediary for CDLFs.
LICU Survey Response Summary
Sample from NCUA
Designated low-income
Total assets in top quartile
Designated low-income
Total assets in top quartile
Designated low-income
Top 400 in total assets
Designated low-income
Top 400 in total assets
Other (Opportunities, Alte
Grand Total - Blended Res
Credit Uni on Survey
Number Responses Percent
Email A-i 60 6 10.00%
Email A-2 49 3 6.12%
Total 109 9 8.260/
Response Rate 15.00/0
Email B-1 120 8 6.67%
Email B-2 100 8 8.00%
Total 220 16 7.27%
Response Rate 13.33%
Email A-1 19 2 10.53%
Email A-2 16 1 6.25%
Total 35 3 8.57%
Response Rate 1 5 .79%
Email B-1 50 2 4.00%
Email B-2 46 3 6.52%
Total 96 5 5.21%
rnatives)
ponse Rate
Response Rate 10.000/
2
249 35 14.06%
CDLF Survey Response Summary
Sample
OFN members
Total asset data
OFN members
Other (TRF, BCC, CEI)
Grand Total - Blended Response Rate
Loan Fund Survey
Number Responses Percent
Email C-1 80 22 27.50%
Email C-2 50 21 42.00%
Total 130 43 3 3 .08%
Response Rate 53.75%
Email C-1 64 9 14.06%
Email C-2 55 10 18.18%
Total 119 19 15.97%
Response Rate 29.69%
3
144 65 45.14%
Appendix 2.
LICU Survey Questions and Selected Responses


Micoenterprises 36% (8)
Small Businesses 54% (14)
Housing Developers 14% (3)
Conununity Non-Profit 54% (13)Organizations
Commerial Developers 27% (6)
Residential morgages
Auto as
Personalloans
Individuals 100% (30) 3%(1) 0%(0)
Religious Institutions 100% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Foundations 33%(1) 100% (3) 33%(1)
Corporations 80% (4) 20%(1) 0%(0)
Federal Government 100% (1) 0%(0) 0% (0)
State/Local Governments 67% (2) 33% (1) 0% (0)
Banksniftsiedit Union. 100% (7) 43%(3) 14%(1)
Non-Depository Institutions
(e.g. insurance company, 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0)
pension fund)
Credit UnionIntennediaries 100% (3) 67%(2) 33%(1)
Other 1flh1 0% (O 0% (0m
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Appendix 3.
CDLF Survey Questions and Selected Responses


Microenterpnse loans
Smal business loansi
Affordable housing
construction loans
Affordable housing pennanent
loans
Conununity non-profit
working capital loans
Coiminity non-profit real
Federal Government
State/Local Governments
an-TfrhrinCrePAit Unions
35% (6)
24% (6)
57%fl2A
80% (20)
67%(1) 24(3
Non-Depository Financial
Institutions 100% (1) 0%(0) 0%(0)(e.g.insurance company:
pension fund) ____________ ____________
RaMWC IInemdais0%kO) if0%(G) 0i(G1)
Other
Religiou nstiiin 54 - (LI) 0% (0)
Foundations 58%8(26) 7% (39) 9%(4)
Corporations 39% (13) 76% (25) 12%(4)
Federal Government 60%(25) 93% (39) 2%f)
State/Local Governments 30% (12) 82% (33) 5%(2)
Banks/rhrifts/Credit Unions 76% (34) 64%(29) 38%(17)
Non-Depository Financial
Institutions 80%(S) 10%(1) 20%(2)
(e.g. insurance company,
pension fund)
National CDFI Internediaries
Other
73% (8
50% (2)
45%(5) 0%(0)
25% (
Commercial real estate 3553
construction loans
Commercial realestate33
permanent loans
Other (pleas e speci 5
5.Fo which of the following sources did the loan fumd rece ive funds in the frst year of operation?
fCheck aU thar appiv3
Individuals 62% (13) 71% (15) 0% (G)
Religious Institutions 67% (14) 62% (13) 0% (0)
Foundations 30% (8) 85% (23) 4% (1)
Corporations 32% (6) 79% (15) W% (0)
0%(0t)_
4% (1)
24%(5)
60% (3) 20%t (1)70%m1


Appendix 4.
List of Informants
Opportunities Credit Union
Antonia Bullard, Associate Director
Cheryl Fatnassi, Chief Operating Officer
Tim Kranz, Chief Financial Officer
Dawn Moskowitz, Director, Opportunities Ventures
John O'Kane, Board Member
Caryl Stewart, President and Chief Executive Officer
The Reinvestment Fund
Margaret Berger Bradley, Director, Communications and Investor Relations
Michael Crist, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Don Hinkle-Brown, President, Lending and Community Investments
Jeremy Nowak, President and Chief Executive Officer
Diane-Louise Wormley, Board Member
Other CDFI Informants
Alice Greenwald, Director, Capitalization Program, National Federation of Community
Development Credit Unions
William Myers, Chief Executive Officer, Alternatives Credit Union
Mark Pinsky, President and Chief Executive Officer, Opportunity Finance Network
Robert Schall, President, Self-Help Ventures Fund
Michael Swack, Professor, Southern New Hampshire University
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